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Abstract 
This paper reviews empirical methods used to estimate the impact of 
trade policies under imperfect competition.  We decompose the welfare effects 
of trade policy into four possible channels:  (i) a deadweight loss from distorting 
consumption and production decisions; (ii) a possible gain from improving the 
terms of trade; (iii) a gain or loss due to changes in the scale of firms; and, (iv) 
a gain or loss from shifting profits between countries. For each channel, we 
discuss the appropriate empirical methods to determine the sign or magnitude 
of the effect, and illustrate the results using recent studies.  Two other channels 
by which trade policy affects social or individual welfare - through changes in 
wages and changes in product variety - are discussed more briefly.  Recent 
developments in the analysis of trade policies under perfectly competition are 
also reviewed. Estimating  the  Effects of  Trade  Policg 
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Governments  of  all countries  routinely  intervene  in  trade across  borders, 
through  the  use  of  tariffs,  quotas,  and  other  non-tariff  barriers, in ways  that  they 
would  not  do  within their borders.  Reductions  in these  trade restrictions  are 
regularly  achieved  through  international negotiations,  but  even  as  one  set  of  trade 
barrierls  are  lowered,  there  remain barriers  in other  sectors  waiting  to be  addressed. 
An  important  part  of  this ongoing  policy  process  is the measurement  of  the costs of 
trade restrictions.  Beginning  with the  deadweight  loss  calculations  of  Johnson 
(1960).  each  new  round  of  tariff negotiations  has  seen  an  attempt  to measure  the 
gains  to the countries  involved.  The  small  size of  gains  for  industrial  countries has 
been  adjusted  upwards  by  more!  recent  estimates,  that  incorporate economies  of  scale, 
while the  developing  countries  are  typically  estimated  to receive larger  gains.' 
In  a  way,  those  involved  in the initial calculations of  the  gains  from  tariff 
removal1 had  it easy:  everyone  knew  that  the  gains  were positive,  and  only  the 
magnitude  remained  to be  determined.  This  iron-clad  rule has  been  challenged  by  the 
recent  theories  of  imperfect  competition and  trade,  which  suggest  various  ways  that  a 
country  may  gain  through  the  use of  'strategic'  trade policy.  Krugman  (1987) has 
argued  that  the presumption  in favor  of  free  trade is still a reasonable  rule of  thumb, 
though  not  a guarantee,  under  these circumstances.  This  conclusion  is reinforced by 
computable  models  of  imperfect  competition and  trade,  in which  the  ambiguity  of  the 
theoretical  results is resolved by  introducing  a minimum  amount  of  data.  These 
models  often  show  that  the  scope  for  strategic  policy  is very  limited.*  It can be 
questioned,  however,  whether  the results  from  these  computable  models  are really 
convincing.  They  share  with the deadweight  loss  calculations  the reliance on 
elasticity  assumptions,  but  add  onto  this  another  layer  of  assumptions  on  the conduct 
of  firms,  which  are not  verified  from  any  empirical evidence.  While  the  qualitative 
conclusions  may  not  be  guaranteed  from  the  start,  there is enough  structure forced on 
the models  that  the  data  coultl never  refute the theory. 
In  this chapter  we  shall  examine  how  imperfect  competition  affects the gains and  losses  from  trade policies,  but  focus  on  ampirical  models  that  estimate  the 
impact  of  trade policies,  with minimum  structure imposed  on  the  data.  Like Krugman, 
we  will conclude  that  there  is little support  for  national  gains  due  to strategic  trade 
policies,  but  unlike the compu~tabl~e  models,  the data  has  an  opportunity  to accept  or 
reject  the hypotheses  being  considered.  In  their chapter  in this  volume.  Leamer  and 
Levinsohn  adopt  the principle of  "'estimate, don't  test'  as  a desirable methodology  for 
evaluating  trade theory.  The  analogous message of  this chapter  for  the evaluation of 
trade policy  is 'estimate,  don't  calculate.'  This  message  applies  equally  well to the 
analysis  of  trade policies  under  perfectly  competition,  and  recent  developments  in that 
context  will also  be  reviewed. 
We  begin  in section 2  by  decomposing  the  welfare effects of  trade policy  under 
imperfect  competition  into  four  possible  channels: 
(i) a deadweight  loss  from  distorting consumption  and  production  decisions; 
(ii) a possible  gain  from  improving  the  terms  of  trade; 
(iii) a gain or  loss  due  to changes  in the scale of  firms;  and. 
(iv) a gain  or  loss  from  shifting profits between  countries. 
These channels  are  listed in clecre!asing order  from the  greatest  to the  least  amouni  of 
available empirical evidence,  end  our  discussion  of  each  will vary  accordingly.  Two 
others  channels  by  which  trade  policy  affects  social  or  individual  welfare -  through 
changes  in wages  and  changes  in product  variety  -  are  not  examined  in the theoretical 
model,  but  will be  discussed  at  the end  of  the chapter. 
Deadweight  losses  and  the  t:erms of  trade  will be  the  focus  of  our  analysis  in 
section  3,  where  tariffs are  considered.  An  important  insight  of  the  imperfect 
competition models  is that  'no  country  is small':  a tariff can be  expected  to lower 
the price at  which  the  foreign  firms are  willing  to sell  their products,  so  that  the 
tariff has  a beneficial  terms  of  trade effect.  We  find that  this prediction has 
received  indirect empirical  support  from  studies  of  exchange  rates, but  that  the 
magnitude  of  the  terms  of  trade  impact  differs a great  deal  across  industries.  It 
follows  that  We  cannot  presume  that  tariffs  will lead  to  a  terms  of  trade  gain  in most  industries,  so  that  this channel  does  not  amount  to an  argument  for  strategic 
Wade  policy.  On  the contrary,  the use  of  tariffs in the  form of  antidumping  duties 
has  been  found  to lead  to a terms of  trade loss,  due  to collusion between  firms, ever1 
rn cases  where  the duties  are  riot  imposed. 
Attention is shifted  to import  quotas  in section  4, and  their  effect  on  product 
quality.  In many  industries,  quotas  have  led to an  increase in the quality  of  imports 
purchased,  which is an  optimal  response  by  consumers  and  firms.  We  argue  that  this 
upgrading  imposes  an  additional  deadweight  loss,  over  and  above  the loss  from a tariff 
of  the same  average  magnitude.  We  introduce  an  index  number  method  that  can be used 
1:o  measure  this loss,  and  which  applies  more  generally  to any  non-uniform  trade 
harriers over  multiple goods.  The  effects of  the 'voluntary'  export  restraint  on 
.,Japanese auto  sales  to the U.S.  are  also considered.  Extensive modeling of  the 
;wtomobile industry  has  led to estimates of  how  the price-cost  margins,  and  profits 
of  firms. have  responded  to  quotas.  These  studies provide  indirect  evidence  on  the 
hypothesis  of  Bhagwati  (1965), Harris  (1985)  and  Krishna  (1989). that  quotas  lead  to 
more collusive market  conduct. 
In sections  5  the effects of  trade policy  on  the markups  of  firms, and  thereby 
on  their  output  and  prof its, is considered.  Recent  studies  for  developing  countries 
have  demonstrated  that  trade  liberalization can  lead  to substantial  reductions  in 
price-cost  margins,  at  least  in those  industries  that  are  imperfectly  competitive. 
Corresponding  to these reductions  in margins  will be  an  increase  in firm-level  output, 
which  leads  to welfare gains  if there  are  economies  of  scale.  Conversely,  in 
industrial countries  it is more  common  to treat  import  competition as  a potential 
source  of  unemployment,  with private (if not  social)  losses.  The  evidence  linking 
import  competition,  wages  and  employment  for  the United  States  is reviewed  in 
section 6,  and  the impact  of  changes  in product  variety  is also considered.  In 
section  7  we describe  an  ongoing  project  to provide  international  data,  and  present 
conclusions. 2.  General  Framework 
In order  to organize our  subseqent  discussion,  we  first show  how  the  welfare 
effects of  trade policy  under  i,mperfect competition can  be  decomposed  into separate 
components.  We  shall  slightly  extend  the  framework  of  Rodrik  (1  988).  and  treat 
imports  and  domestically  produced  goods  as  imperfect  substitutes.  Let  the  index i 
denote  goods i=l  ....,  I, each  of  which  is available in an  import  and  domestic  variety. 
a 
Imports  are  sold  at  the international  price  pi  and  the domestic  price pi,  where 
a 
(pi  - Pi  is a  wedge  reflecting tariffs or  quotas.  Domestically  produced  goods  are 
exported  and  sold  domestically  at  the price qi,  where  for convenience  we  ignore  export 
taxes or  subsidies.  We  let Ci denote  the consumption of  each  import  good,  and  let Di 
denote  the  consumption of  the domestically  produced  variety.  The  overall level  of 
expenditure needed  to obtain the level of  utility U can  be  written as  a  function 
E(p,q.U),  depending  on  the  pricle  vectors  p = (p, ,...,  pl)  and  q=  (q, ....,  41).  The  derivatives 
of  the expenditure  function with respect  to prices  equal  the levels of  consumption: 
We  will suppose  that  each  domestically  produced  good  is sold by  ni  firms, where 
the output  each  firm is denoted  by  yi, and  industry  output  is Yj~niyi.  The  rota1 costs 
for  each  firm in industry i are  denoted  by  +i(Yi,~),  where  w  is the  vector  of  wages. 
Under  increasing  return to scale,  average  costs  exceed  marginal  costs,  so  that 
+i/~i>+iy = d+ildyi.  Denote  the endowment  of  each  factor  of  production by  Vj, 
j=lJ  Under  full employment,  the endowment  equals  the total demand  for each 
factor,  which  is obtained  by  differentiating  the cost  function  with respect  to wages. 
and  summing  across  firms  and  industries: 
Under  any  system  of  import  tariffs and  quotas,  the level of  home  utility can be 
determined  by  setting expenditure  E  equal  to the  value  of  income  from all sources: The  first term on  the right  of  (3) is profits  earned  across  the  industries,  which 
would equal  zero under  free entry.  The  second  term is the value of  factor  income. 
The  third term is total tariff revenues  or  quota  rents,  if these  are  redistributed to 
consumers.  If the quota  rents  are  instead captured  by  foreigners, as  occurs  under  a 
'voluntary'  export  restraint  (VIER),  then  these  rents  will not  appear  in the  third term 
in (3) because  pi =pi. 
Let  UO  be  the level  of  welfare obtained  under  free  trade,  with expenditure equal 
to income  in (3).  Our  goal  to compare  the  level  of  welfare obtained under  free  trade 
with that  obtained  under  some  trade policies.  Rather  than  directly  compare  utilities, 
it is convenient  to ask  how  much  income  the consumers  need  to give up  (or  be 
compensated)  in the presence  o~f  the  trade policies, to obtain  the  same level of  utility 
UO  as  under  free trade.  This  income  is computed  by  taking  the  difference between 
total income  received  under  the  trade  policies,  and  consumer  expenditure  E(p,q.u0)  at 
the  free  trade  utility u0: 
H(P*~.P*~~O)  = {ti  [qi - (9ilyi)lyi +  xj  WjVj  + ti  (pi - p;)~i}  -  E(P,~.u~)  ,  (4) 
where  p*  is the  vector  of  world prices  for  imported  goods.  The  right  side of  (4) is 
just  the difference between  the right  and  left  sides  of  (3).  except  that  we compute 
consumer  expenditure  at  the  free  trade utility level  UO  .  If (4)  is positive,  it 
represents  the  gains  due  to the trade policies,  while if (4) is negative  then it 
represents  the losses,  so  that  I3  can  be  interpreted as  a measure  of  welfare or 
"benefits.'  In addition,  I3  can be  interpreted as  the  balance  of trade  surplus  (deficit 
if negative)  obtained  with the utility  level  UO  in the presence  of  the  trade policies. 
2.1  We1 fare  Effects 
To  determine  the effect of  any  small  change  in trade policy,  let  UO  now  denote 
the utility  level  at  any  initial equilibrium  with tariffs and  quotas,  satisfying  (3). Then  the change  in welfare due  to a small change  in trade policy  can be  obtained by 
totally  differentiating  (4), holding  UO  .fixed.  Making  use  of  (1)  and  (2).  the resulting 
change  in welfare can  be  written as. 
The  first  term on  the right of  (5)  is the deadweight  loss caused  by  the change  in 
import  volume.  The  second  s'ummation is the terms  of  trade effect, on  both exports 
(Yi  - Di) and  imports  Ci.  The  third term is the difference  between  average  and 
marginal  costs  (which  is positive), multiplied by  the change  in industry  outputs  due  to 
changes  in firm outputs,  reflecting the potential  for  raising  welfare  through  greater 
use  01'  economies  of  scale.3  The  final term on  the right of  (5)  is the change  in 
profits caused  by  a change  in industry  outputs.  This  term disappears  if profits  were 
equal  to zero  initially, as  under  free entry. 
We  should  also mention  two other  channels  by  which  trade policy  affects 
welfare,  that  are  ignored  in (5).  The  first is changes  in employment  in the presence 
of  wage  distortions  across  industries.  In this case,  an  expansion  of  employment  in the 
highest-wage  industries  increases  welfare:  in terms  of  equation  (51,  the  average 
costs  of  production exceed  th'e social  opportunity  costs  of  withdrawing  workers  from 
other  industries.  Katz  and  Summers  (1 989a,b)  have  argued  that  wage  distortions 
across  industries  justify  the  luse  of  trade policy,  as  will be  discussed  in section  6. 
The  second  is changes  in the number  or  range of  differentiated products  available. 
While  we  have  treated the  import  and  domestic  variety  as  imperfect  substitutes,  we 
have  not  allowed  for changes  in the range  of  these  varieties  available,  as  would  occur 
under  monopolistic  competition.  The  welfare impact  of  changes  in domestic  variety 
requires  a comparison of  marginal  costs  and  benefits,  but  the impact  of  an  increase 
(decrease)  in import  variety  is always  positive (negative).  The  welfare effects of 
changes  in product  variety  has  received  little empirical  attenti~n,~  though it is an ,important  area  for  further research,  as  also  discussed  in section  6. 
2.2  Mode  of  Market  Conduct 
So  far, we have  not  specified the  form of  industry  pricing.  In some  cases  in 
this chapter  we  will concentrate  on  perfectly  competitive  pricing,  and  in other  cases 
allow  for  oligopoly  pricing.  These  can  be nested by  using  a general  form of  the 
pricing relation,  which  is writ.ten for  the  domestic  firms  as: 
where  ni  I-dlnDi/dlnqi  denotes  the elasticity  of  demand  for  the domestic  good,  and  8i 
denotes  the  firm's 'mode  of  market  conduct':  Biz0 under  perfect  competition,  and 
Oi>O under  oligopoly.  For  example,  if we  assume  Cournot-Nash  pricing,  then  8,  equals 
the  share  (l/ni) of  an  individual  firm.  More  generally,  8,  reflects  the  strategies 
played  by  domestic  firms,  as  well as  their  size-distribution.  Methods  for  estimatiy 
the market  conduct  have  been  developed  as  part  of  the 'new  empirical  industrial 
organization,'  surveyed  by  Bresrtahan (1989). While  we  will not  discuss  these methods 
until section 5, it will be  clear  that  some  of  the empirical techniques  dealt  with 
hefore  then  provide  information on  the market  conduct  parameter. 
The  analogous  pricing relation for  the  foreign  firms is: 
where  x;  denotes  the exports  (or  output)  of  each  foreign  firm,  with total exports 
**  * 
I  C  (x1.w  are  foreign costs: ql  i  -dlnCj/dlnpi  denotes  the elasticity of 
demand  for  imports;  and  8:  denotes  the  foreign  firms' 'mode  of  market  conduct.' 
[:inally,  if there is free entry  (of  firms, prices  will equal  average cost, so  that. 
for  the  domestic  and  importing  firms, respectively . 3.  Tariffs 
In this section and  the next,  we  focus  on  the first two terms in (5) -  the 
deadweight  loss  and  terms  of  trade  effect -  while ignoring  the  welfare effect  of 
changes  in domestic  output  arid  profits, which  will be  considered  in section  5. 
Initially,  we will consider  an  ad  valorem  tariff of  t applied  to a single  good,  and 
suppose  that  the prices of  all other  goods  are  held constant.  Then  dropping  the 
subscript  i, the  first two terms  in (5)  can  be  written as: 
dB  dC  dp*  -=  (p-p )z-Cz. 
dt 
where C  denotes  imports of  the good  in question. 
Let  pa  denote  the initial,  free trade price of  the  good.  By  integrating (10) over 
the tariff levels between  0 aind  t.  we can  obtain an  expression  for  the  total change  in 
welfare  due  to the  tariff: 
This  derivation can  be  understood' by  referring  to Figure  1,  where  we show  the 
domestic  import  demand  curve  C  and  the  foreign export  supply  curve  x*.  The effect of 
the  tariff is to lower  the international price  from pa  to p*, and  raise the  domestic 
price from pa  to p=p*(l+t).  The  first  term on  the right  of  (1  la) is the deadweight 
loss, equaling  areas  F+H in Figure  1,  and  the second  term is the terms of  trade gain. 
equal.ing areas  G+H.  Alternatively,  we can cancel  area  H  in both  these  terms,  and 
obtain  (1  1 b),  where  the first term on  the right is the  deadweight  loss  F,  and  the 
second  term is the  terms of  trade gain  G. 
If  the demand  curve is linear, then  the  deadweight  loss F can  be  written as 1 
j.(p-po)(~o-~l).  where  C'  is expenditure on  imports  at  the domestic  price p=pW(l  +t) 
1'0 measure  this cost  we  need  estimates  of  the change  in imports  due  to the  tariffs, 
zs  well as  the change  in the domestic  price of  the importable.  If international prices 
are  fixed,  then  the change  in the  domestic  price is just  the (specific)  tariff.  The 
crop  in imports  is frequently  obtained  by  multiplying  the  (ad  valorem) tariff by  a 
'reasonable'  import  demand  elasticity.  As  simple  as  this  triangle  formula  is, it is 
frequently  used  in policy  analysis  (e.g.  Hufbauer  and  Elliott,  1994). 
Despite  the  attracti'veness; of  using  a simple  formula  to measure  the deadweight 
I~SS,  this approach  has  several  limitations.  The  most  obvious  is that it is extremely 
sensitive  to the projected change in imports,  so  that  the deadweight  loss has  a 
standard  error  that  is proportio~nal  to that  of  the  demand  elasticity  used,  which  is 
most  often not  reported  in this context.  Furthermore,  studies  such  as  Leamer 
(1988a.b.  1990)  have  directly  estimated  the  impact  of  tariff and  non-tariff  barriers 
on  imports,  and  found  that  this impact  is very  small  or  even  of  the 'wrong'  sign. 
This  leads  us  to question  whether  the use  of  "reasonable'  import  demand  elasticities 
to measure  the loss  in (1  1) is supported  by  the data  at  all. 
Leamer  suggests  that  the unusual  magnitudes  obtained  from  direct  estimation of 
the effects of  tariffs on  import's  may  be  due  to a simultaneity  problem:  high  tariffs 
may  be  applied  to those  industr.ies with high  imports.  In this case,  a regression of 
imports  on  tariffs could  not  be  expected  to uncover  the  import  demand  elasticity. 
Instead,  the elasticity  should  be  obtained  by  explicitly  recognizing  the endogeneity  of 
tariffs and  non-tarif f  barriers,  and  modeling  these  with another  equation motivated 
from  a political-economy  framework:.  This  is the  approach  taken  by  Trefler  (19931, 
with dramatic  results:  when  trade  protection  for  the U.S.  in 1983  is modeled 
endogenously,  its estimated  impact  on  imports  is 10  times larger  than  obtained  by 
treating  it as  exogenous.  While  additional  work  would  be  desirable to see  how  this 
estimate extends  to other  samples,  these  results illustrate the usefulness  of  an 
estimation  approach. 3.1  Trade  Distortion  Index 
A  second  limitation of  the  triangle  formula  arises  when  non-uniform  tariffs are 
applied over  multiple industries.  In this case,  a common  empirical practice is to 
average  the tariff rates,  and  then  compute  a deadweight  loss  triangle  for  this average. 
The  problem  with this approach  is that  the average  tariff  is computed by  adding  up 
tariff revenue  over  all the goods  being considered,  and  then dividing by  total 
expenditure  on  imports.  For  example,  applying  this method  to the U.S.  yields  an 
average  tariff level  of  3.7% in manufacturing.  However.  this method  of  computing  the 
average  tariff is completely  wrong  for making  any  welfare inference.  The  reason  is 
that  a prohibitive  tariff  would  lead  to zero  tariff revenue,  and  therefore not  be 
counted  at  all in the average.  A valid  averaging procedure,  however,  can  be obtained 
from  the balance  of  trade  function in (,4), and  is referred  to as  a 'trade  restrictive- 
ness  index'  by  Anderson  and  Neary  (1  992,  1994a.b)  and  Anderson  (1994a.b).5 
To  develop  their  index,  let ti denote  the ad  valorem  tariff on  good i. Suppose 
0  that  international  prices  are  fixed  at  pi, so  that  domestic  prices of  the imports  are 
0 
Pi  =pi'(l  +ti),  or  the vector  p.  Letting  UO  be  the  level  of  utility obtained  with free 
trade,  then  ~(p,q.pO,uO)  is interpreted  as  welfare under  the  tariffs.  Now  consider 
obtaining  the same  leve'l of  welfare under  a  uniform import  tariff  at  the rate T,  so 
0  that  domestic  prices  are  pi(l+T),  or  the  vector  pO(l+~).  Then  the 'trade  restrictive- 
ness  index'  is defined  as  the value of  T  that  results  in the same  level of  welfare as 
the  individual  tariffs ti. 
In order  to determine  the  index  corresponding  to any  pattern of  individual 
tariffs, we would need  to solve  for  T from (121,  as  could be  done  with a computable 
general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model.  However,  some  insight  into the properties  of  this 
index  can be  obtained by  differentiating  (12) with respect  to T  and  ti, holding  world 
prices  constant.  This  exercise  yields, For  fixed world prices,  the  de~rivative  of  6  with respect  to domestic  prices  is given 
0  by  the first term in (10). or  OB/dpi =(pi  -pi  )dCi/dpi.  which is interpreted  as  the 
marginal  deadweight  loss  of  the  tariff.  Assuming  that  the import  demand curves  are 
linear,  we  can  integrate (13) over  values  of  the individual  tariffs from  0 to ti, 
i=l  ,...,I,  and  for  the  trade  res1:rictiveness  index  between  0 and  T.  Performing  this 
exercise,  we obtain. 
The  trade restrictiveness index  is therefore  a weighted  average  of  the  squared 
values  of  individual  tariffs ti. where  the  weights  reflect  the  change  in import 
expenditures caused  by  a one  percent  change  in the price:  (d~~/d~~)(~p)~  =  p~(d~i/dlnpi). 
0 
evaluated  at  the  free trade prices  pi.  Using  these  weights,  prohibitively  high  tariffs 
will still receive positive  weight  in the  index.6  Having  the squared  value of 
individual  tariffs appear  in (1  4) means  that  the restrictiveness index  will depend  on 
both  the weighted average  level of  the  tariffs, and  their  variance,  where both  these 
measures  are  sometimes  used  by  policy   analyst^.^  This  reflects the general  result 
that  increases  in the  dispersion of  tariff rates  will raise their  deadweight  loss. 
Given  an  estimate of  the  trade restrictiveness  index  T,  the  deadweight  loss  olf 
these  tariffs could be obtained by  using  a triangle  formula,  applied  to the change  in 
the Hicksian  aggregate  of  imports between  the price  po and  po(l +TI.  The  problem, 
however,  is that  this hypothetical  change  in aggregate  imports  is not  the same  as  the 
observed  change  due  to the actual  tariffs, and  would  therefore need  to be  calculated 
using  some  elasticity  for  the Hicksian  aggregate,  multiplied by  T.  This  leads  us  to 
the  same  limitation discussed  above.  namely,  that  the use  of  a 'reasonable'  elasticity 
for  the Hicksian  aggregate  woluld  not  be  based  on  the drop  in imports in the data.  'The same  reliance  on  elasticity parameters  occurs  in the calculation of  the  trade 
restrictiveness  index  itself  (to obtain  dCi/dpi  for  the  individual  imports  i).  Thus. 
while this  index  solves  the problem  of  how  to aggregate  tariffs over  multiple goods, 
it does  not  really  meet  our  criterion of  'estimate,  don't  calculate.'  In section  4.1, 
we  will discuss  an  alternative method  for  measuring  the deadweight  loss  from  trade 
barriers  applied  over  multiple goods,  which goes  some  distance toward meeting  this 
criterion.  These  two methods  for  measuring  the deadweight  loss  are noted  tn  the 
first row  of  Table  1,  where  we  shall  keep  a running  list of  trade policy  issues  and  the 
available estimation methods. 
3.2  Terms  of  Trade 
Returning  to the case  of  a tariff on  a single good,  let us  now  consider  the 
possible  terms  of  trade effect.  In  competitive  models.  the  tariff  results  in a  terms 
of  trade gain only  if the reduction in import  demand  is large enough  to lower  the 
world price,  as  illustrated in Figure  1.  Since  any  country  is but  a  fraction of  the 
world market,  there has  been  il  tendency  to treat  the terms  of  trade as  fixed in policy 
analysis.  However,  the  imperlect competition  literature suggests  that  tariffs  will 
result  in terms  of  trade gains  regardless  of  the buyer's  size,  since  foreign exporters 
w~ll  generally  not  allow  consumer  prices  in the  importing country  to rise by  the  full 
amount  of  the  tariff.  This  behavior  simply  reflects  profit-maximization by  the 
foreign exporters,  and  we  refer  to it as  'incomplete  pass-through'  of  the  tariffs. 
This  result  was  first noted  by  Katrak  (1  977), De  Meza  (1979) and  Svedberg  (1  979)  for 
a monopoly  model,  while Brandler  and  Spencer  (1 984)  further  developed  it in a monopoly 
and  ol~gopoly  context,  and  Gros  (1  987) extended  it to a monopolistic  competit  ion 
framework.  We  shall  illustrate the result  for  the  simple case  of  a  foreign 
monopolist  facing  a linear  demand  curve in the home  country. 
In Figure  2,  the foreign  firm faces  the home  demand  curve of  C,  and  has  constant 
marginal  costs  of  production of  +;.  The  profit-maximizing price and  imports  are  pa. 
cO,  where  marginal  revenue  equals  marginal  cost.  If  a  specific  tariff of  s  is applied. then  the marginal costs of  selling in the home  market  rise by  the amount  s.  leading  to 
a fall in sales  from c0 to c',  and  an  increase  in the domestic  price from pa to p. 
However,  because  the demand  curve  is only  half  as  steep  as  the marginal  revenue  curve, 
the increase  in price is only  one-half  as  much  as  the rise in marginal costs:  it 
follows  that  the net  price received  by  the  foreign  firm has  fallen,  p* = (p - s) < po, 
which  is a terms  of  trade  gain  for  the  importing country.  For  small  specific  tariffs, 
this  terms of  trade gain  will occur  whenever  the  demand  curve  is flatter  than  the 
marginal  revenue  curve. 
The  welfare gain  for  the!  importing country  equals  G-F  in Figure 2,  where  these 
areas  have  the same  interpretation as  in the competitive case  illustrated in Figure  1 
To  maximize  the gains,  the home  country  should  apply  a tariff until the derivative in 
(1  0)  equals  zero.  Writing the change  in import  demand  as  dC/dt=(dC/dp)(dp/dt),  the 
optima'l  ad  valorem  tariff  t*  can  be  readily  solved  as: 
dlnp 
t*  = (a[(--)'  dln(1 +t)  - I]  , 
where  q*  is the elasticity  of  import  demand,  and  dlnp/dln(l+t) is the response of  the 
tariff-inclusive price  to changes  in the  tariff, or  the  "pass-through  elasticity.'  If 
the pass-through  elasticity  is less  than  one,  then  the  foreign  firms are  absorbing  part 
of  the  tariff by  lowering  their  selling price,  and  the optimal  tariff  is positive.  This 
expression  for  the optimal  tariff contrasts  with the more conventional 'inverse  of  the 
foreign  supply  elasticity"  formula,  which is not  a helpful  way  to think  about  the 
optimal  tariff  when  the  foreign  firm is imperfectly  competitive,  and  has  no  supply 
curve (but  just  points  of  optimal  supply). 
There  have only  been  a lew cases  where  the pass-though  elasticity has  been 
estimated  for  tariffs, but  a  large number  of  cases  where  this elasticity  has  been 
estimated for changes  in exchange  rates, in what  is called 'pricing  to market' 
behavior  (Krugman.  1987).  To  see  the connection  between these,  suppose  that  the 
import  is provided  by  a single foreign  firm with output  equal  to import  demand,  x*=C. Write the marginal  costs  of  the  foreign  firm as  f;=v*(~)w*e.  where  v*'>(<)O 
denotes  rislng (falling)  margiinal  costs,  w*  is an  aggregate  of  foreign  factor  prices. 
and  e denotes  the (actual  or  expected)  exchange  rate to convert  the  foreign costs  into 
the  domestic  curren~y.~  An  appreciatxon of  the exporter's  currency  corresponds  to a 
rise in e.  The  first-order condition  (9)  1s  now  written as: 
-  (1  +z) [I - (f)]  =  v*(c)w*.  , 
where  p/(l+t) is the  import  price net  of  the  tariff, and  8"  denotes  the mode of 
market  conduct.  Assuming  that  the  domestic  and  import  varieties of  the  good  in 
question  are  weakly  separable  from other  goods  in the expenditure  function,  then 
import  demand  C  and  the elasticity  q*  depend  on  the prices p and  q  of  the import  and 
domestic  goods,  as  well as  consumer  expenditure  E  on  just  these  goods.  Then 
multiplying both  sides  of  (16) by  the  tariff  factor  (l+t),  the tariff-inclusive  price of 
the importable can be  solved  from  (16)  as  an  implicit  function: 
It is immediate  from  (17) that  changes  in the tariff, dln(l+t), and  changes  in 
the expected  exchange rate,  dlne,  should  have  equivalent  effects on  the domestic  price: 
Feenstra  (1989) refers  to thi,s as  'symmetric'  pass-through  of  tariffs and  exchange 
rates.  The  pass-through elasticity  can be  solved  from (16)  as: 
where  dlnq*/dlnp  is the change in the demand  elasticity  q* with respect  to a change 
in the import  price.  This  term reflects changes  in the price-cost  margins  charged  by 
firms.  For  demand  curves  that  are  less convex  than  a constant-elasticity  curve,  the 
elasticity  q  increases  with price,  dlnq*/dlnp> 0.  This  means  that  exporters  lower their markups  as  their  currency  appreciates,  so  the pass-through  elasticity  is less 
than unity.  However,  it is evident  from (14)  that  rising marginal  costs  (vN'>O) will 
also make  the pass-through  less  than  unity.  Thus,  the empirical  finding of  incomplete 
pass-through  is consistent  with either  imperfectly  competitive  pricing,  or  rising 
marginal  costs  under  perfect  competition.  When  foreign  firms are  exporting  to 
multiple markets,  as  discussed  below,  we  will be  able  to control  for changes  in 
marginal cost  due  to changes  in output  or  other  reasons:  in this case,  a pass-through 
elasticity  less  than  unity  will be  interpreted  as  evidence  of  imperfect  competition,  or 
'pricing  to market'  behavior. 
Feenstra  ( 1989)  tests  for equal  pass-through  of  tariffs and  exchange  rates  for 
U.S.  imports of  heavyweight  motorcycles  and  compact  trucks  from  Japan.  The  former 
was  subject  to a tariff between  April 1983  and  October  1987,  declining  from  45  to 
10  percent.  while the latter has  had  a 25  percent  tariff imposed  since August  1980. 
A  log-linear  form  for  (1 7)  is used, 
where  pt  is the annual  price of  Japanese cycles or  trucks,  qit refers  to the price of 
various  competing  varieties,  aind  ~t is a random  error.  The  expected exchange rate et 
is modeled  as  a weighted  average  of past  spot  rates (though a forward rate could  also 
be  used).  Several  of  the regressors  in (1  9) are  endogenous,  including  the prices  qit and 
expenditure  Et,  so  the regression is estimated  with instrumental  variables. 
Symmetric  pass-though  of  exchange rates  and  tariffs is tested as  the equality 
of  oc  and  8.  For  compact  trucks  the  estimated coefficients  (standard  errors) were 
0.63  (0.08)  and  0.57  (0.141,  respectively,  while for  heavyweight  cycles  the point 
estimates  were  0.89  (0.22)  and  1.13  (0.16).  The  hypothesis  that  these  two 
coefficients are  equal  for  each  product  is accepted,  and  when  this hypothesis  is 
imposed,  the estimated coefficients  are  0.58  (0.06)  for  trucks  and  1.08  (0.15)  for 
motorcycles.  The  pass-througih  of  less  than unity  for compact  trucks  means  that  the tariff led  to a  terms of  trade  gain,  but  this  apparently  did  not  occur  for  motorcycles, 
where  the pass-through  is insignificantly  different  from  unity.  Feenstra  argues  that 
the  difference in the pass-through  in these  two industries  reflects  the  different 
market  shares  of  Japanese  imports:  in trucks,  the  Japanese  imports  faced  significant 
competition  from  American compact  models  that  were newly  developed:  whereas  in 
heavyweight  cycles,  the only  (competitor was  Harley-Davidson,  which had  a relatively 
small  market  share. 
3.3  Exchange  Rate  Pass-  Through 
Many  other  studies  have  estimated  the pass-through of  exchange  rates  rather 
than  tariffs.  Knetter  (1989,1993) and  Gagnon  and  Knetter  (1  992) use  panel  data  for 
industry  exports  to several  destination  markets.  Marginal  costs  to destination  market 
*  * 
k  are  written a3  vU(xt  )wt  ekt,, depending  on  total exports  xt  from each  firm, and  the 
exchange rate ekt  between  the  source country  and  destination market  k.  In this case 
**  * 
foreign  marginal  costs,  v  (xtllwt , can  be  estimated  as  a fixed-effect  for  each  period. 
**  * 
Letting  ot  r ln[v  (xtlwt  I denote  this  fixed-effect,  the  estimating equation  becomes: 
where  pkt  is the price of  the export  in the destination market  currency.  Xk  is a fixed 
effect  across  destination markets,  and  €kt is consumer  expenditure  in that  market. 
The  aggregate  price of  competing  goods  is used  as  a deflator  for  all the  variables  in 
(20),  so  it does  not  appear  explicitly.9  The  advantage  of  this  formulation over  (1  9)  is 
that  we  are  able  to control  for  any  changes  in foreign marginal  costs using  the  fixed 
effect  at.  For  example,  the prices  of  imported intermediate inputs  would  depend  cm 
the exchange  rate, which  would  affect  the  degree  of  pass-through  unless  controlled 
for.10  By  estimating  foreign marginal  costs  as  a fixed effect, the pass-through 
coefficient  dk reflects only changes  in price-cost  margins,  so  that  ock< 1  is evidencze 
of  imperfect  competition. 
Knetter  (1989,1993)  firids  incomplete  pass-through  over  a  wide range  of manufactured  goods,  for exporters  from  several  countries.  Generally,  exporters  frorn 
the Germany.  Japan  or  the U.K.  are  found  to have  lower  pass-through coefficients than 
exporters  from  the United  States  (high pass-through  for U.S.  exporters  was  also  found 
by  Mann,  1986).  However,  this pattern appears  to be  primarily  due  to differences 
across industries.  In  the industries  for  which comparable export  data  were  available 
for these  four  countries,  no  significant  difference in the pass-through  behavior  of  the 
exporters  could be  found.' l  K~netter  concludes  that  industry  effects appear  to be  more 
important  than  either  source  or  destination-market  effects  in explaining  differences 
in pass-through  behavior. 
The  mode  of  market  conduct  parameter  8"  appearing  in (18)  will influence  the 
degree  of  pass-through.l2  Feinberg  (1 986.1 989a,l99l) tests  the related hypothesis 
that  market  concentration  affects  the pass-through  of  exchange  rates  to domestic 
prices.  In  terms of  our  framework,  assuming  for  simplicity  that  output  y  goes 
entirely  to domestic  demand  (i1.e.  there  are  no  exports).  the  first-order  condition  (6) 
can  be  solved  to determine  the equilibri.um level of  domestic  prices, 
Analogous  to the  determination of  import  prices  in (18).  domestic  prices  depend 
on  the mode  of  market  conduct,  as  well as  on  the import  prices  themselves.  This  is 
one  route by  which changes  in exchange  rates  will influence domestic  prices,  and  a 
second  route is the use  of  imported  intermediate inputs,  which  affects the  factor 
price aggregate  w  in (21).  Feinberg  finds  that  the impact  of  exchange  rates on 
domestic  prices  is higher  for  those  industries  depending more heavily  on  imported 
interme-diates,  or  producing  goods  that  are  close substitutes  for  imports,  and  lower 
for  capital-intensive  and  concentrated  industries.  The  estimating equation  should  be 
viewed as  a reduced  form of  (18) and  (21), where  domestic  prices  are  solved  in terms 
of  the variables  [wae(l  +t).w  ,~,8".81.  More  recently,  Ceglowski  (1 991  )  and  Feinberg 
(1  993)  have  simultaneously  estimated  (1  8)  and  (21  ), and  Feinberg  finds  that  the 
indirect  effect  of  exchange  rates on  U.S.  prices  -  through  the import  prices  - dominates  the  direct  effect  through  imported  intermediates. 
The  general  conclusion  to be  drawn  from these  studies  of  exchange  rates  and 
international prices  is .that pass-through  is less  than  unity  for many  manufactured 
products,  but  its magnitude  differs a great  deal  across  industries.  This  conclusion  is 
indicated  in the  second  row  of  Table  1.  Even  without relying on  complete  symmetry  of 
pass-through between tariffs and  exchange  rates  (as  would  not  occur  with imported 
intermediates.  for example),  these results  indicate we  should  not  have  any  presump- 
tion about  the extent of  term  of  trade  gain  due  to tariffs, but  must  treat each 
industry  on  a case-by-case  basis.  Moreover,  it should  be emphasized  that  the terms  of 
trade is but  one component  of  the welfare effects discussed  in section 2,  and  evidence 
of  a large  terms  of  trade gain  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  a  tariff in that  industry 
is desirable.  For  example,  in the cases  of  U.S.  import  of  compact  trucks and 
heavyweight  motorcycles,  the  tariff on  motorcycles  was  temporary  (lasting  four 
years)  and  allowed Harley-Davidson  to recover  its profitability,  while the  tariff  on 
compact  trucks  is still in effect.  For  th~s  reason  alone.  the  tariff on  cycles  might:  be 
judged  superior  to that  on  trucks, even  though  it did not  yield a terms of  trade gain. 
3.4  Antidumping  Duties 
In recent  years  there has  been  a  surge  in cases  of  alleged  dumping,  which is 
defined  in U.S.  law  as  foreign products  exported  to the US.  at  prices  below  'fair 
value,'  i.e. either  below  the prices  of  comparable  goods  sold  in the exporter's  home 
market, or  below  the cost  of  production.  In cases  where  it is determined  that 
dumping  has  occurred,  antidump 
turned  their  attention  to these 
frequency  (Baldwin and Steagall 
ling  duties  can  be  applied.  Researchers  have  recently 
cases  to understand  both  the reasons  for  their 
. 1993; Hansen and Prusa, 1993).  and  the  welfare  efff?cts. 
One  explanation  for  the  frequency  of  cases  is related  to the incomplete pass- 
through of  exchange  rates.  If  foreign currencies  appreciate,  and  foreign exporters 
raise  their  prices  (in the importer's currency)  by  less  than  the  appreciation,  then  it 
is quite possible that  the imiport  price will be  less  than  the  foreign cost  or price of comparable  goods,  when  these  are converted  at  the current  exchange  rate.  Thus,  the 
appreciation  of  foreign currencies  makes  the  finding  of  'less  than  fair  value'  more 
likely.  On  the other  hand,  the imposition of  a dumping  duty  also  requires  that  imports 
cause  "material  injury'  to the domestic  industry,  which  is less  likely  when  foreign 
currencies  are  appreciating.  Feinberg  (1  989b)  finds  that  the  first of  these effects 
dominates,  and  the  frequency  of  dumping  complaints  in the U.S.  (particularly  those 
against  Japan)  increases  with the  appreciation  of  foreign currencies. 
A  second explanation  for the  frequency  of  cases  is that  filers expect  some 
benefit  even  before a case  is concluded.  Prusa  (1992)  was  the first to recognize  that 
antidumping  petitions can  be  withdrawn prior  to their  resolution,  in which case  the 
domestic  and  foreign  firms are permitted  to  jointly  determine  the  selling price  for 
imports  (typically  negotiated  through  the Department  of  Commerce).  Cases  can  also  be 
suspended prior  to their  termination,  in exchange  for  a promise  by  the  foreign firms 
to stop  dumping.  We  expect  that  both  these  actions  would  lead  to an  increase  in 
import  prices,  and  a terms of  trade loss.  In addition,  the  investigation of  'less  than 
fair  value'  may  also  lead  exporting  firms to  increase  their  prices,  to lower  the 
probability  of  a positive finding.  Harrison  (1991) and  Staiger  and  Wolak  (1994) 
examine  the impact  of  these  various  "non-duty'  channels  on  imports,  and  find that  the 
impact  is substantial.  In particular. Staiger  and  Wolak  find that  suspended 
agreements  lead  to a reduction  in imports  (with an  implied  increase in price)  similar 
in magnitude  to cases  were  duties  are  applied.  Furthermore,  the impacts of 
investigations  themselves  are  substantial.  providing  about  one-half  the reduction  in 
imports  that  would  occur  from duties. 
Thus,  we  see  that  the  app!ication  of  anti-dumping law  has  increased collusion 
between  domestic  and  foreign  firms and  reduced  imports, even  when  duties  are  not 
levied.  This  conclusion  in indicated  in Table  1, and  shows  how  rather  than  imperfect 
competition  leading  to a  strategic use  of  trade policy.  the  antidumping  policy  it  self 
has  led to an  enhancement  of  collusive behavior.  Without  any  tariff revenue  collected 
in this case,  the importing country  very  likely  suffers  a welfare loss.' 4.  Quotas 
For  nearly  all quotas  used  in the United States,  the rents are earned by  the 
foreign exporters  in the  form  of  higher  prices,  as  under  'voluntary'  export  restraints 
(VERS).'  In terms of  equation  (51,  the domestic  and  international  prices  of  imports 
* 
are equal  (pi =Pi  1,  and  the  importer  faces  an  increase  in this price,  which  is a terms 
of  trade  loss.  With  the competitive  foreign supply  curve  X"  in Figure  1, a quota  at 
the  level  C'  would increase  the  (domestic  and  international)  price of  imports  to p, 
resulting in quota  rents  of  E+G.  Relative  to free trade,  the cost  to the importing 
country  equals  the areas  E+F.  Calculations  of  these  losses  for  the  principal  U.S. 
quotas  are  summarized  In Feenstra  (1  992). 
While  the  fact  that  foreign exporters  earn  the  quota  rents means  that  they 
might  gain  from  the  trade restriction, this  result  is not  assured.  In Figure  1,  where 
competitive  foreign exporters  have  the  supply  curve  x", the  foreign gain due  to a quota 
at  C'  equals  E-H,  where  H  is a deadweight  loss  for  the foreign producers.  This  gain 
will be  negative  if the  quota  is sufficiently  restrictive.  In  the  case  of  monopo1ist:ic 
foreign supplier,  the impact  of  the  quota  at  C'  on  foreign profits  is measured  by  E-H 
in Figure  2,  which  is necessarily  negative  since profits  were maximized  initially.  In 
contrast,  under  oligopoly  a quota  at  near  the  free trade  level can  raise  the profits of 
foreign  exporters,  and  possibly  also  of  domestic  firms, due  to more collusive  market 
conduct.  This  is demonstrated  by  Harris  (1985) and  Krishna  (1989). extending  the 
analysis  of  Bhagwati  (1965).  Indirect  evidence of  the impact  of  quotas  on market 
conduct  will be  presented  in section  4.2.  The  converse  hypothesis  -  that  trade 
liberalization will lead  to less  collusive pricing -  has  recently  been  confirmed  for 
several  developing countries,  as  we  shall  discuss  in section 5.1. 
In comparison  with tariffs, estimation  of  the  welfare costs of  quotas  is more 
difficult  for  two reasons.  First, the  amount  by  which  the  quota  raises  the  domestic 
price -  or  the  price-equivalent  of  the  quota  -  is not  directly  observed,  but  must  be 
estimated.  One  common  method  for doing  so  is  just  the reverse of  what  we described 
in section  3  for calculating  the  drop  in imports under  a tariff:  take the  difference between  the  quota  level  and  some  projected  (free trade)  imports  as  the  drop  in 
quantity,  and  multiply  this (percentage)  drop  by  a 'reasonable'  import  demand 
elasticity, to obtain  the increase in price due  to  the quota.  This  method  suffers  from 
the  same  problems  discussed  for  the tariff  case:  the estimated price increase is very 
sensitive  to both  the projected imports  and  the  demand  elasticity  that  are used,  and 
would have  a standard error  depending on  both  of  these.  In order  to directly  estimate 
the impact  of  the quota  on  price.  an  alternative method  is to compare  the price in the 
quota-restrained market  to that  in some  similar market  that  does  not  have  the  quota. 
This  method  will be  described  for  the automobile  industry,  in section  4.2. 
In order  to estimate the impact  of  quotes  on  import  quantity,  the method  used 
by  Leamer  (1  988a.b.  1990)  and  Trefler  (1  993)  is to specify  a structural  model  of 
imports,  the  Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek  (HOV)  model,  and  then  investigate how  tariffs. 
quotas,  and  other  non-tariff  barriers  affect  the  import  levels.  Leamer  uses  this 
approach  to develop  measures  of  the 'openness'  of  the industries and  countries  in his 
sample.  The  advantage  of  these  measures  is that  they  consistently  estimate  the 
impact  of  the  trade  barriers  arid  their  standard  errors.  The  disadvantage,  however,  is 
that  they  are  very  sensitive  to the  structural  model  used  to estimate  the  import 
equations.  This  disadvantage  is seen  most  clearly  by  considering  studies  that  also  use 
the HOV  model,  but  do  not  include  data  on  trade barriers. For  example,  Lawrence 
(1987) and  Saxonhouse  (1989) are  both  interested  in the  question  of  whether  Japan 
imports  'too  little'  as  compared  with other  countries,  and  both  use  the HOV  model 
extended  to allow  for  intra-industry  trade  to specify  the  import  equations.  But 
without  having  explicit  data  on  trade barriers,  the hypothesis  of  importing 'too 
little'  is evaluated by  the residuals  in the estimated import  equations,  and  these 
authors  are  simply  not  able  to agree  on  the  statistical and  economic  significance of 
these residuals.  This  controversy  appears  to be  resolved  by  Harrigan  (1  991  1,  whose 
results  support  the conclusion  that  Japan  does  indeed  import  'too  little,'  but  then.  :so 
does  the United States!  This  conc1,usion is listed in Table  1. 
A  second  feature not  tak:en into account  in the  welfare costs  is the possibility that  the  quota  leads  to quality  upgrading.  This  upgrading can  refer to either  a  shift 
in demand  towards  higher  priced  import  varieties  (i.e..  a change  in product  mix). or  to 
the  addition  of  improved  chariilcteristics  on  each  variety.  Using  the terms  suggested 
by  Helpman  and  Krugman  (198!5), the  first case  fits the 'love  of  variety'  approach  used 
to describe consumer  preferences  under  monopolistic  competition,  since  we use  a 
utility  function  defined  over  ell varieties;  whereas  the second  case  fits the 'ideal 
variety'  approach.  In both cases.  we  will argue  that  the quality  change  leads  to an 
additional  deadweight  loss  due  to the quota.  These  two cases  are discussed  in the 
following  sections,  the  first dealing  with an  index  number  method  to measure  the 
upgrading  and  its welfare loss,  and  the  second  focusing on  hedonic  methods  applied  to 
U.S.  imports  of  automobiles. 
4.1  Quality  Upgrading  and  Welfare Loss 
To  illustrate the change  in product  mix,  let  the subscript i  now  denote  varieties 
of  some  differentiated import  good,  where  pi is the price of  each  variety.  We  will 
suppose  that  these  imports  are  weakly  separable  from  all other  goods  in the overall. 
utility  function, and  let  U(C)  denote  the  sub-utility  function corresponding  to these 
imports,  where  C I  (C, ,.....  C,)  is  the  import  vector.  In the case  where the imports  are 
intermediate  goods,  then  U(C)  is interpreted as  a production  function,  and  we shall 
suppose  in general  that  it is Ihomogeneous  of  degree one.  The  corresponding  expenditure 
function can  then be  written as  EI(p.U)  =e(p)U, where p = (p, ,...,p I). and  e(p)  is the 
expenditure  function  to obtain one  unit  of  utility.  We  will treat  each  import  variety 
as  sold under  perfect  competition  with a fixed marginal cost  of  vy,  though  many  of 
the results below  can  be  generaliked  to imperfect  ~ompetition.~ 
Each  foreign  firm faces  an  import  quota  on  their  sales  to the domestic  market, 
and  also collects  the quota  rents  (as  under  a  VER).  While this  quota  restricts the 
total sales  to the domestic  market -  denoted by  C -  it can be expected  to also change 
the relative sales  of  the various  import  varieties.  To  see  this, suppose  that  each 
firm can  produce  several  possible import  varieties.  Then  to maximize  the rents obtained,  each  firm would ensure  that  they  earn  the  same  quota  premium  s from each 
variety  exported  (if this  were not  true,  then  the  firm would  export  more  of  the 
variety  with the  highest  quota  premium,  and  thereby  lower  its price and  premium). 
Thus,  import  prices  after  the  quota  will equal  marginal  cost  plus  the  quota  premium, 
or  v;+s.16  ~elative  to their  free  trade  values,  import  prices  have  risen by 
cvl+s)/v;  = 1 +(s/v;).  so  that  the higher-priced  import  varieties  have  the  lowest 
percentage  increase in price.  Ilt  follows  that  demand  will shift  towards  the  higher- 
priced  import  varieties. 
This  shift in the relative! composition of  imports  is sometimes  called  an 
increase  (or  upgrading)  in import  'quality'.  The  definition of  'quality'  implicitly 
heing used  in this case  is the  total  utility per  unit  of  the  import, or u(c)/??.  Since 
expenditure  equals  E(p,U) = e(p)lJ,  this  definition of  quality  can  be  rewritten as 
II(C)/C  =  [E(p,U)/CI/e(p)  i UV/c!(p),  where uv a  ~(p.u)/C  denotes  the  unit-  value of 
imports  (which is simply  the  average  price).  Thus,  we  see  that  quality  equals  the 
ratio of  the unit-value  to the  unit-,expenditure  function  e(p).  The  quota  will increase 
the unit-value  for  two reasons:  because  the price of  each  variety  increases,  and 
because  demand  shifts  towards  the higher-priced  varieties,  thereby  pulling up  the 
average.  However,  the  quota  will increase  the unit-expenditure only  due  to the  first 
reason  -  the price increase  for  each  variety.  Thus,  the  quota  can be  expected  to 
increase  the unit-value more  than  the price index,  and  therefore raise  this measure of 
quality  (Falvey.  1979). 
To  empirically  test  for  tlhe  change  in quality  due  to a quota,  we  construct  the 
ratio of  quality  in two years  t.-1 and  t: 
where  r[(pt,pt-1 ,Ct,Ct-l)  = e(pt)/e(pt-  1 )  denotes  an  exact price index  that can be 
constructed using  data  on  import  prices  and  quantities,  and  equals  the ratio of  the 
unit-expenditure  functions.  The  idea  behind  an  exact  price index  is that  it measures the ratio of  unit-expenditure  functions,  even  when  the functions  themselves  are  not 
fully  known.  For  example,  if the  unit-expenditure  function is a quadratic  function of 
prices,  then a Fisher-Ideal  price index  can  be  used  to measure  the ratio (where the 
Fisher-Ideal is a geometric  mean  of  the Paasche  and  Laspeyres  indexes1.l  The change 
in import  quality  betwee~n  two years  is measured  by  taking  the natural  log  of  (211, 
Thus,  an  increase  in import  quality  occurs  when  the unit-values  rise by  a  greater 
percentage amount  than an  exact  price index.  The  impact  of  the quota  on  quality  is 
evaluated  by  letting t-1  and  t  denote  years  before  and  after the  quota  comes  into 
effect.  and  comparing  the change  in quality  during  this period  with other  years  when 
trade policy  did  not  change. 
This  method has  been  applied  to 1J.S.  imports of  footwear  and  steel.  In 
footwear,  Aw  and  Roberts  (1986) evaluate  the  1977-81  quota  with Korea  and  Taiwan. 
Upgrading  of  the import  bundle  was  observed  in most  quota  categories  throughout  this 
period,  and  accounted  for  12% of  the observed  rise in the unit-value of  footwear 
imports.  For  steel.  Boorstein and  Feenstra  (1991) measure  quality  upgrading  due  to 
the  VER  negotiated with Japan  and  the European  Community  in 1969.  Comparing  that: 
year  with 1968.  the unit-value rose by  15%. but  nearly  half  of  this  increase  (7%) was 
due  to an  increase  in import  quality, or  a  shift  towards  higher-priced  varieties  of 
steel.  Some  of  this upgrading  was  reversed  in 1971,  when  the agreement  broke  down. 
but  when  it was  renewed  duri~ng  1972-73  quality  again  rose by  a modest  amount  (3%). 
The  agreement  lapsed  in 1974,, and  in subsequent  years  the change  in import  quality 
was  erratic, and  quite small.  The  evidence  from  these  and  other  industries  strongly 
supports  the hypothesis  of  upgrading  under  quotas.  as  indicated in Table  1. 
It could be  expected  that  the change  in import  composition -  or  quality  -  due  to 
the quota  would  have  a deadweight  loss over  and  above  the cost  of  an  'equivalent' tariff.  One  reason  to expect  this  .is  from our  discussion of  the trade  distortion index, 
In section  2.1.  There  we  argued  that  when  the percentage  tariffs across  products 
differed.  the deadweight  loss  would depend  on  both  the mean  and  the variance of  these 
rates.  The  same  observation  applies  to a  quota.  Even  when  the quota  premium 
(denoted by  s)  is equal  in dollar  terms  across  products,  when  expressed  as  a percentage 
of  marginal  cost  (i.e.  s/v;)  the premium  is highest  on  the lower-priced  products. 
This  explains  the  shift in import  composition,  and  will result  in an  additional 
deadweight  loss.  For  example,  Anderson  (1  991  )  applies  the trade distortion index  to 
evaluate U.S.  quotas  on  cheese,  and  finds  that  the shift in import  composition  due  to 
the  quotas  accounts  for  16% of  the total consumption  cost.18 
Anderson's  methods  requires  that  the  trade  surplus  function in (4) and  (12) be 
calculated.  An  alternative way  to measure  the  additional  deadweight  loss  of  the  quota 
using  index  numbers  is developed by  Boorstein and  Feenstra  (1991). and  is illustrated 
in Figure  3.  There  we  show  the! case  of  two import  varieties  C1  and  C2.  where  the 
0  a 
free  trade price (equal  to marginal  cost) of  the  first exceeds  the  second,  p, r  V,  > 
0  a 
p2=v2. Under  free trade, consumption is at  C0 where  utility of  UO  is obtained.  A 
quota  on  these  two goods,  with the  quota  premium of  s.  will lead  to a greater 
percentage  increase  in the price of  variety  1.  For  fixed total expenditure,  the budget 
line shifts inward  and  rotates counter-clockwise,  so  at  the new  consumption  point  of 
C'  there is greater  relative demand  for  variety  1:  this  illustrates the shift in 
import  composition,  or  quality  upgrading. 
Utility under  the quota  is ul,  but  higher  utility could be  obtained  from an  ad 
valorem tariff of t,  with tariff  revenue  equal  to the quota  rents  at  the point  C1.  By 
setting the revenue  equal  to rents  at  this consumption  point,  the  ad  valorem  tariff t 
is what  would typically  be  calculated as  the price-equivalent  to the  quota.  Applying 
this  tariff, however.  leads  to a parallel  inward  shift of  the  original  budget  line,  to 
the point  where  C'  is still affordable  (since revenue  equals  rents at  that  point).  The 
optimal  choice  for  the consumer  on  this budget  line is c2. with utility of  u2.  Thus. 
higher  utility of  u2 is available  than  with the  quota.  and  the  difference (u2-u1)  can  be interpreted  as  the  extra  deadweight  loss  due  to the  quality  upgrading. 
While  Figure  3  is probably  familiar  to the reader,  it is not  generally  recognized 
that  the  difference  (u~-u~)/u~  can  be  easily  calculated  with available  data.  To  see 
this, note  that  the ratio U1/lJ[' can  be  measured by  an  exact  quantity  index  between  the 
free trade and  quota-induced  consumption points  Co and  C1.l  Since  we kept  total 
expenditure  fixed when  comparing  free  trade  and  the  quota,  the exact  quantity  index 
equal  the inverse of  the exact  price index.  Thus,  utility under  a quota,  relative to 
free  trade,  is U1/UO=  n(po.pl ,C0,C1  I-'.  where  p1 denotes  the  quota-inclusive prices  and 
po the  free-trade prices. 
Turning  to the ratio u2/U0. it car) be  measured  by  the inverse of  the increase in 
prices  from  po to p2=p0(1  +TI, relative  to any  fixed consumption point.  Choosing  the 
2  1  0  1 
quota-induced  consumption  point  c',  we  obtain U2/U0  =(xi  piCi/xi  However, 
since  the budget  lines  under  the  tariff  and  quota  both pass  though  the point  C1 
(reflecting the  fact  that  the  tariff revenue  equals  the  quota  rents).  we  have  that 
2  1  1  11  0  1  -1  xi piCi =xi  pic,.  It follows  that  u2N0  = (xi piCi/xi piCi)  ,  which is precisely  the 
inverse of  the Paasche  price  index  between  the  free trade  and  quota- 
Thus,  we  have  shown  that  the extra  deadweight  loss  equals. 
.induced points. 
which is the inverse of  an  exact  price index  minus  the inverse  of  the Paasche.  If the 
data  are consistent  with utility maximization,  then  the Paasche  index  understates  the 
true rise in prices,  so  that  (22)  is positive. 
Boorstein and  Feenstra  1:1991)  ha've applied  this  formula  to the quota  on  U.S. 
steel  imports  during  1969-74, and  obtain a deadweight  loss  due  to quality  upgrading  of 
about  1 %  of  import  expenditure during  'these  years.  Based  on  the  1970 expenditure. 
this is a welfare cost  of  about  $15 million.  It should  be  stressed  that  this cost  i,s 
additional  to the conventional  deadweight  loss  triangle that  would  be  calculated using 
the price-equivalent  tariff 5.  This  tariff has  been  estimated at  about  7%,  which  can lead  to a deadweight  loss  triangle between  0.5 -  1% of  import  expenditure,  depending 
13n what  estimate is used  for  the change  in imports.  Thus,  the extra  deadweight  loss; 
Jue to the quality  upgrading  is at  least  as  high  as  the conventional  deadweight  loss 
triangle,  and  possibly  larger.20 
It is worth noting  that  the  formula  in (22) can  also be  derived using  the trade 
surplus  function  from  (4), as  in Boorstein  and  Feenstra  (1991).  In  that  case,  a  tariff 
(3nd quota  leading  to the  same  increase  in the import  price index  are compared.  The 
difference between  the  trade  surplus  with these  two instruments,  relative to initial: 
.mport expenditure,  is given  by  (22).  In general,  this  index  number  method  is an 
ijlternative to the trade distortion index  for  evaluating  the  welfare loss  due  to a non- 
uniform  tariff  stru~tures.2~  In comparison  with the  trade  distortion index,  this 
method  seems  to impose  less  structure on  the data.  Whereas  the  trade distortion 
index  is typically  calculated  from  a  CGE  model,  and  relies  on  the elasticity 
parameters  used,  the  index  number  comparison  in (22)  simply  reflects the extent  of 
substitution between products  in the data.  This  is clear  from Figure  3,  where  the 
distance  (u2-u1)/u0 depends  on  how  much  the consumption  point  C'  differs from C2. 
In addition to the application  we have  described  in steel, this index  number  method  has 
also been  applied  to quality  upgrading  in autos.  but  not  for  any  other  industries; 
lurther  work  is necessary  to determine  its general  usefulness. 
4.2  U.S.  Automobile  Imports 
One  of  the most  extensively  studied  quotas  in the United  States  is the 
'voluntary'  export  restraint  (VER)  on  Japanese  automobiles,  that  began  in 1981  and 
expired only  recently.  For  this  trade policy  we have estimates  of  the price impact  of 
the  VER.  its effect on  product  quality.  and  its impact  on  the profits of  U.S.  producers. 
i3s  will be  reviewed  in this section. 
The  appropriate concept  {of  quality  for  automobiles  is the  utility obtained  frorn 
its characteristics.  Empirically,  the  market  equilibrium locus  between  prices  and 
characteristics is estimated  us'ing a hedonic  regression (Griliches, 1971  1,  which is a linear  regression of  prices  (us;ually  in logs)  on  characteristics.  The  estimated 
coefficients  in this  regression are!  generally  interpreted  as  the  marginal  value  that 
consumers  place on  the charac:teristics,  which  in equilibrium  also equals  the marginal 
cost  to firms.22  Then  quality  car1 be measured by  a weighted average  of  the 
characteristics,  using  their  estimated coefficients as  weights.  It has  been  shown  in 
various  theoretical  models,  under  either  perfect  or  imperfect  competition,  that  a 
quota  may  cause  an  increase  in product  characteristics,  though  this result  is not 
guaranteed  (Rodriguez.  1979;  Olas  and  Donnenfeld.  1987.  1989; Krishna.  1987). 
Using  a  hedonic  regression,  Feenstra  (1988a) estimates both  the price the 
quality  change  in Japanese  automobiles  exported  to the U.S.  under  the  VER  that  began 
in 1981.  The  regression  is splecified  as: 
where  Zit  is a vector  of  characteristics  for each  car  model i in year  t, such  as 
weight.  width,  height,  and  horsepower.  and  st  is the price effect of  the  VER  in year  t. 
Note  that  the  VER  is modeled  as  leading  to a  specific (dollar)  price  increase,  whereas 
the coefficient  oct  allows  for any  other  percentage change  in prices  (due  to inflation, 
for example).  When  both  st  and  ocp  are  estimated,  multicollinearity  between  them 
leads  to very  high  standard errors.  Feenstra  solves  this problem  by  pooling  the auto 
data  in (23)  with data  for   import:^  of  Japanese  compact  trucks  to the U.S.  Trucks 
were not  subject  to the  VER,  but  did have  a  tariff  of  25% imposed  since  1980.  The 
hedonic  regression  for  trucks  omitted  the  specific  price  terms  st, and  allowed  for 
different  coefficients  on  the characteristics.  while imposing  the  same  coefficients  on 
the percentage  price changes  o(t  (after correcting for  the  impact  of  the  ad  valorem 
tariff).  In this way,  the increase in the  quality-adjusted  prices  of  both  Japanese  cars 
and  trucks  that  would have  occurred  without trade barriers  are  treated as  identical. 
and  the remaining impact  of  the  VER  in cars is estimated by  o(t.  Rather  precise 
estimates of  this price impact  are  obtained,  ranging  from  $434 in 1981  to $1,096 in 
1984  (with standard  errors  of  $250 and  $267. respectively). Using  the coefficient estimates  from  (231,  the  quality  of  each  car  is measured 
by  e~p(oc,~~~  + $'zit).  The  incriease in product  quality  accounted  for a substantial 
portion of  the nominal prices  increases  in Japanese  auto imports  during  the VER.  For 
example,  in the  first year  of  the  V'ER  quality  rose by  7% on  average over  the models, 
which  was  one-third of  the average  price increase.  Over  the entire 1980-85  period, 
quality  upgrading  accounted  for  fully  one-half  of  the increase  in prices.  We  expect 
this upgrading  to have  a deadweigh.t loss  for  two reasons:  due  to the changing 
composition  of  imports (as  corisumers  substituted  towards  luxury  models),  and  also 
because  consumers  would attach a  declining  shadow  value  to the extra characteristics 
added  onto each  model.  Using  a more  general  version of  (18).  Feenstra  (1993)  shows 
that  the  deadweight  loss  of  the upgrading  is surprisingly  large,  between  one-quarter 
and  one-third of  the  quality  increase  itself, or  about  $500 in 1985.  Combining  the 
transfer of  quota  rents and  the  deadweight  loss  due  to upgrading,  we obtain  $1,500 
over  the  1.8  million autos  imported,  for  a  welfare loss  to the U.S.  of  $2.7 billion 
annually  (not  including  the conventional  deadweight  loss). 
Dinopoulos  and  Kreinin (1988) have  also used  hedonic  regressions  and  several 
other  methods  to estimate  the  increase  in the prices  of  European  cars exported  to the 
U.S.,  and  find  that  these  prices  increased  by  about  one-third,  with a  further cost  to 
the U.S.  of  $3.4 billion annua1l.y.  Unless  the European  firms had  strongly  increasing 
marginal  costs  for  their  sales  to the U.S.,  which  seems  unlikely,  these  price increases 
support  the hypothesis of  a change in market  conduct.  That  is,  if initially  the 
European  producers  were engaged  in Bertrand  competition in prices  with the  Japanese 
firms,  then  the presence  of  the  VER  would cause  them  to instead treat  Japanese 
quantities  as  fixed (since  the  VER  specified  the  total sales  of  each  company),  with a 
corresponding  increase  in price.  This  seems  like the most  plausible explanation  for 
the  increase in the European prices  found  by  Dinopoulos  and  Kreinin,  though  a direct 
estimate of  the mode  of  market  conduct  is not  made.23 
In order  to estimate the effect  of  the  VER  on  profits of  auto  producers,  it is 
necessary  to  jointly  estimate  demand  and  costs.  Bresnahan  (1981)  provided  the  first, fully-specified  estimates of  the oligopoly  equilibrium  in the U.S.  automobile  market. 
where  each  consumer  has  an  ideal  auto  variety  on  a line of  characteristics.  Later 
work  by  Goldberg (1992) and  Berry.  Levinsohn  and  Pakes  (1994)  has  generalized  the 
demand  side of  this model  while  jointly  estimating  the cost  side,  and  these  authors 
calculate  the impact  of  various  trade policies.  There  is some  disagreement  concerning 
which years  the VER  was  most binding.  Goldberg  finds  that  in 1983  and  1984  the VER 
was  binding  with a price impact  of  about  $1,000 (similar  to that  found  by  Feenstra, 
1988a).  The  quota  was  increased  in 1985,  and  Goldberg  finds  that  it was  not  binding 
in that  year  or  1986.  though  it becomes  binding  again  in 1987.  In contrast,  Berry, 
Levinsohn  and  Pakes  obtain estimates of  the price impact  of  the  VER  that  are 
insignificant  in  1981-83, and  then  rise steadily  in subsequent  years. 
However,  these  authors  are  iin  agreement  on  the overall conclusions  for  trade 
policy:  the quota  was  much  worse  than  a equivalent  tariff, that  would  have  led  to the 
same  reduction in Japanese  import's.  Both  studies  find a substantial  increase  in 
American  and  European prices  due  .to the  VER,  again offering  indirect evidence  of  the 
change  in market  conduct.  Berry,  I-evinsohn  and  Pakes  estimate that  European producers 
increased  their  profits  by  about  $1  billion annually  in 1987-89,  while the profits of 
U.S.  producers  increased  by  $3-5 billion annually.  This  gain  for  American  firms 
illustrates the 'profit-shifting"  effects of  trade policy,  and  would  not  be  present  in a 
competitive model.  The  prof its of  Japanese producers  fall only  slightly, because  the 
quota  rents nearly  offset  the reduction in profits  through  lost  sales.  Over  the entire 
1984-1  990 period.  these  authors  estimate that  the  VER  increased  U.S.  profits by  $1  6 
billion, but  created  a loss  for U.S.  consumers  of  $18 billion,  for a cumulative net  loss 
to the U.S.  of  $2 billion.  In contrast,  the  revenue  raised  from an  equivalent  tariff  is 
estimated at  $14.5 billion,  so  that:  the U.S.  welfare gain  from  this  tariff would  have 
been  $12.5 billion.  Thus,  this industry  appears  to be  an  instance  were strategic  trade 
policy  -  in the  form of  a tariff -  could  have  worked, but  this was  not  the policy  that 
was  actually  used. 5.  Estimating Markups 
In  the previous  sections,  'we have  ignored  the potential change  in the output  of 
domestic  firms due  to trade policy.  This  appears  as  the  third term  on  the right  side 
of  (5). where  a  change  in the  olutput  of  domestic  firms  is multiplied by  the  differenc:e 
between  average  and  marginal  cost:  an  expansion  in the  output  of  firms  with 
increasing  returns  provides  a  welfare gain.  There  is  some  indirect evidence  that 
increasing  returns  serve  as  a  source  of  comparative  advantage,  which  suggests  welfare 
gains  (Tybout.  1993).  Rather  than  directly  test  the  effect of  trade policy  on  industy 
output,  however,  an  alternative method  has  been  to estimate the  impact  of  policy  on 
the  price-cost  margins  charged  by  firms. 
Under  freedom  of  entry  ar~d  zero  profits,  the  price-cost  margins  and  the output 
levels  can  be  related by  dl.viding conditions  (6) and  (81,  to obtain: 
The  left-hand side  of  (24) is the  ratio of  average  to marginal  costs,  which  is 
sometimes  called the  degree  of  increas~ng  returns  to scale,  and  we shall  denote  it by 
Xi.  The  right-hand side  is the ratio of  price to marginal cost, or  the  degree  of 
rionopoly  power,  and  is denoted  by  Jli. It:  is normally  assumed  that  the  degree  of 
increasing  returns  to scale  falls as  output  increases.  In  that  case,  there  will be  a 
negative relationship  between  firm output  and  the  price-cost  ratio pi:  an  increase  in 
output  is  associated  with a  fall in this ratio, and  conversely.  Thus,  trade policies 
that  lead  to a  fall in markups  can  be  expected  to have  a  beneficial  welfare effect. 
through  the  expansion  of  firm outputs.24  Effects of  this  type have  been  captured  in a 
CGE  model  of  Cameroon  by  Devaraja~n  and  Rodrik  (1991  ),  who  calculate the  welfare 
gains  from  trade  liberalization  as  between  one  and  two percent  of  national  income. 
The  question  we  address  in this  section  is how  one could  econometrically  estimate the 
impact  of  liberalization on  markups. 5.1  Hall  Method 
One  method  for estimating markups  has  been  suggested  by  Hall (1988), and  relies 
on  the same  data  that  could be  used  to estimate productivity  in an  industry.  Levinsohn 
(1993) and  Harrison  (1994a) have  applied  this method  to panel  data  sets  on  firms in 
developing  countries,  facing  trade  liberalization; Levinsohn  considers  the  1984  trade 
liberalization  in Turkey,  while Harrison  considers  the  1985  reform  in Cote  d'ivoire. 
Their  applications  are  described  as  follows. 
Let  the production  function  for  a  domestic  firm denoted  by  i be  specified  as 
Yit =Aitf(Lit,Kit), where  Lit  an'd Kit  denote  the labor  and  capital inputs  (materials  can 
also be  added),  and  Ait  is  a  productivity  parameter.  We  shall  suppose  that  this 
function  is homogeneous  of  deg,ree Xi,  which  is the degree  of  increasing  returns  to 
scale.  Firms  will hire inputs  until their marginal-revenue  product  equals  their  wage. 
or  using  the price-cost  margin  Pit  from  (24) along  with (6): 
dfit  dfi  t 
(qit/Pl  t) --  =  vvt  ,  and  (qitlgit) -  =  rt 
dLit  dKit 
Then  totally  differentiating  the  production  function,  and  using  (251,  we  obtain, 
dYit  'dLit  dKit  dAi  t 
-  Y it 
=  Pit [dit [i;;) 
+
  fit  (XII)]  + 
where  ditsWtLit/qityit  denotes  the  share  of  labor  in total revenue, and  fiitzrtKit/qityit 
denotes  the share  of  capital.  Thus.  (26) states  that  the  growth  in output  is  a 
weighted  average  of  the  growth  in inputs,  where  the  weights  are pitdit and  pit@it. It 
is readily  confirmed  that  these  weights  sum  to Xi,  the degree  of  increasing  returns  to 
scale  of  the production  functiori  (see e.g.  Harrison,  1994a. note  3). 
This  formulation  can  be  contrasted  with the conventional  measurement  of 
productivity  under  perfect  competition,  where  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  is 
defined  as. 
..Pit  -"  Yit  - [dit (2)  +  (,-CA~~)(Z)]  . In  words,  TFP  (also called the  "Solow  residual")  is defined  as  the  difference  between 
the  growth  in output  and  a  weighted average  of  the  growth  in inputs,  where  the 
weights  sum  to unity  by  construction.  Under  this weighting  scheme,  any  portion of 
revenue  not  paid  to labor  -  such  as  pure  profits -  is attributed  to capital.  This 
scheme  gives  too  little  weight  to the  growth  in labor  input  as  compared  to (26). 
dit <JIitdit.  The  reason  for  this  i:j  that  under  oligopolistic  conduct,  firms  will 
restrict  their output  and  hire less  inputs  than  under  perfect  competition.  It  follows 
that  the  marginal  physical  product  of  labor  exceeds its real wage.  The  weight  dit in 
(27) is essentially  using  the  real  wage  (wt/qit) to proxy  for  the marginal  physical 
product  of  labor,  so  it gives  too  little weight  to the  labor  input. 
In  order  to see  how  conventionally  measured  TFP  in (27) can  mismeasure  the 
true  productivity  shock  dAit/Ait, we can  combine  (26) and  (27) to obtain: 
where  we have  used  Ii=j~it(dit+8it).  The  first term on  the right  side  of  (28) 
reflects changes  in the  labor-capital. ratio, and  arises  due  to the mismeasurement  of 
the  weight  on  labor.  The  second  term reflects increasing  returns  to scale  in the 
production  function.  In  studies  of  developing  countries, it is  quite common  to 
correlate  total  factor  productivi.ty  \N ith trade  volumes,  to  determine  whether  firms 
exposed  to international  compet.ition are  more  effic1ent.25  From  (28), it is  apparent 
that  variation in TFP  -  across  industries or over  time -  could be  caused  by  either 
productivity  shocks  dAit/Ait, by  changes  in markups,  by  changes  in the  labor-capital 
ratio, or  by  changes  in the capital  input  under  increasing  returns  to scale,  so  that 
changes  in conventionally  measured  'TFP  must  be  interpreted  with great  caution.26 
One  example  of  an  attempt  to relate protection  to TFP  performance is Krueger 
and  Tuncer  (19821,  who  argue  that  t:here is little connection  between  these  two 
variables  for  a  cross-section of  Turkish  industries.  They  conclude,  therefore,  that 
there  is little support  for  the  idea  of  "infant  industry"  protection.  In contrast, Harrison  (1994b)  finds  that  the same  data  show  a positive correlation  between 
or  non-tariff  barriers and  TFP.  From  (28),  the correlation could  be  explained  by 
either  higher  markups  and/or  higher  input  growth in protected  industries, both  o 
which  are  plausible.  The  presence  of  these effects means  that  conventional  TFP 
measures  do  not  estimate  the true productivity  shock  dAit/Ait,  so  that  a simple 
tariffs 
comparison  of  TFP  w~th  tariffs is not  a  valid  test  for  "infant  industry'  protection. 
In order  to properly  determine  the effects of  trade policy  on productivity.  then. 
it is necessary  to also estimate its effects on  markups  pit.  The  markups  can be 
est~mated  by  rewriting (26)  in  discrete  form  as, 
where  the productivity  changes  are  spec:ified as  AlnAit  =  irt + €it,  and Zt  refers  to an 
average  of  the labor  shares  in years  t-1 and  t.  It is not  feasible  to allow  the markup 
pit to vary  in all years,  so  it is generally  restricted to be  constant  over  some 
intervals,  while possibly  changing  discretely  at  a major break.  In addition,  pit and  Xi 
are  typically  restricted to be  equal  across  firms (though  this can  be  relaxed). 
It  should  be  expected  th,at  the labor  and  capital inputs  in (29) are  affected by 
the changes  in productivity  €it,  so  that  instrumental  variables  must  be  used  in the 
estimation.  Appropriate  instruments  should  be  correlated  with demand  for  factors 
but  not  with productivitg  shocks.  Examples  include  variables  shifting product  demand. 
international  prices  and  exchange  rates, and  sectoral  or  economy-wide  factor  prices. 
Instruments  of  this  type are  used  by  Harrison (1 994a)  in her  study  of  trade 
liberalization in Cote  d'lvoire.  She  finds  declining  markups  due  to trade reform foi-  a 
number  of  industries.  although  the changes  in the markups  are  not  statistically 
significant.  Harrison  allso  finds  that  correcting  the measurement  of  TFP  for changes 
in markups,  and  allowing  for non-constant  returns  to scale,  leads  to a positive and 
substantial  effect  of  trade  reform  on  productivity. 
Levinsohn (1993)  exploits  the panel  nature of  the data  set  to estimate an  annual 
productivity  shock  irt (common  across  firms),  assuming  that  remaining  shocks  €it are not  forecast  by  firms, and  therefore uncorrelated  with factor  demand.  He  finds 
e~lidence  of  decreased  markups  dlue  to liberalization in Turkey  when  comparing  the 
years  1984  with 1985-86,  for  those  industries  that  were  imperfectly  competitive 
initially  (i.e.  with the  markup  significantly  greater  than  zero).  In contrast,  for  the 
two industries  where protection increased,  markups  were  also  found  to increase. 
Thus,  the results  for  both  Turkeg  and  (to a  weaker  extent) Cote  d'lvoire are consistent 
with the hypothesis  of  declining  markups  due  to trade  liberalization.  as  indicated  in 
Tzble  1. 
5.2  Other  Methods 
Our  discussion of  pri'ce-cost  margin!;  has  taken  for  granted  that  these  cannot  be 
dil-ectly  measured  from  firm or  industry  data.  The  reason  is that  accounting  data  on 
costs  cannot  generally  be  relied upon  to obtain  a  marginal  cost  measure,  used  to 
compute  the  price-cost  margins.  Instead,  marginal cost  must  be  estimated,  which  wa:j 
implicitly  done  in the  Hall method.  The  joint  estimation of  marginal cost  and 
marginal  revenue,  together  with  a  market  conduct  parameter,  is  the  starting point  of 
the  "new  empirical  industr~al  economics."  as  surveyed  by  Bresnahan  (1989)  which  is 
hlghly  recommended  for reading.  Some  of  these  methods  have  already  been  mentioned 
in our  discussion of  the  automobile  industry  (section 4.2). 
Aw  (1992,  1993) has  taken  the approach  of  this literature to estimate  the 
markup  conduct  of  textiles exporters  from Hong  Kong.  She  specifies  a  functional  form 
for  the  demand  curve.  from  which  marginal  revenue  is calculated.  Then  the  first- 
or~jer  condition  (6)  is estimated  jointly  with the  demand  curve,  which  yields  an 
estimate of  the  market  coriduct  parameter  eit.  Not  surprisingly,  Aw  finds  that  the 
te:rctile exporters  act  in a  perfectly   competitive  manner.  Schembri  (1989)  takes  a 
similar  approach  to estimate the  mairkups  of  a  major  Canadian  export  industry,  which 
are  then  used  to simulate  the pass-through  behavior.  The  incomplete pass-through  that 
he  finds  provides  additional  evidence of  the exercise of  market  power  by  exporters,  as 
was  discussed  in section  3. 6.  Wages  and  Employment 
So  far,  the only  form  01  imperfect competition  we  have  considered  is that 
exercised by  firms.  However,  it is realistic  to suppose  that  unions  will also exercise 
some  monopoly  power  in the labor  marklet,  with the result  that  workers  with the 
same  skills  in various  iridustries  may  earn  different  wages.  In principle,  this might 
justify  some  type of  trade policy.  Katz  and  Summers  (1989a.b)  have  argued  that  such 
wage  distortions are  pervasive  in industrial  countries,  with more capital-intensive 
industries  paying  higher  wages,  even  after correcting  for  characteristics  of  workers, 
union activity, etc.  This  mearis  that  the high-wage  industries  are  producing  too little: 
in terms of  equation  (51,  the average  costs  of  production  exceed  the  social  opportuni.ty 
costs  of  withdrawing  workers  from other  industries,  so  that  a rise in output  is 
welfare increasing.  Based  on  this  wage  evidence,  they  argue  that  trade subsidies  to 
the  capital-intensive  industries,  which  in  the United  States  are  the export  industries. 
would  be  in the national  interest. 
The  recommendatio~n  of  Katz  and  Summers  is highly  controversial,  to say  the 
least.  One  response  is that  the  wage  distortions  they  identify  may  be  endogenous,  so 
that  the application of  wage  subsidies could  lead  to even  greater  differences in the 
wages  paid  across  industries.  Possible evidence  supporting  this  idea  is provided  by 
Gaston  and  Trefler  (1994a1,  in their  study  of  wage  premia  and  protection in U.S. 
manufacturing.  They  find a strong  positive correlation between exports  and  wage 
premia  across  industries.  If  this correlation also  applies  in a time-series context,  it 
suggests  that  an  expansion  of  exports  would  increase  the premia,  so  it is unlikely  that 
there would be  any  gain  from  applying  an  export  subsidy. 
In any  case,  it is unlikely  that  trade policy  as  practiced  in the U.S.  is directed 
at  resolving inefficiencies  due  to wage  distortions.  Instead,  this policy  seems  to have 
an  equity  rationale.  Under  Article XIX of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs and  Trade 
(GATT),  the use of  tariffs and  quotas  is limited to cases  where  there is evidence  of 
harm  in the importing  industrg.  In  the United  States,  these  rules  are legislated in 
Section  201  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974,  under  which  trade protection can be  granted  if "increased  imports of  an  article are  a substantial  cause  of  serious  injury, or  threat 
thereof,  to the domestic  industry.'  The  following criteria can  be  used  to determine  if 
the industry  has  suffered 'serious  injury':  'the  significant  idling of  productive 
facilities in the  industry,  the  inability  of  a  significant  number  of  firms  to operate  at 
a reasonable  level  of  profit, and  significant  unemployment  or  underemployment  within 
the industry.'  All of  these  criterion are related to a drop  in income  faced  by  some 
factors  in the  industry. 
One  reason to base  trade  poliicy  on  a change  in factor income  is to achieve  the 
following equity  goal:  that  all/  inclividuals  gain  from increases  in trade,  so  that 
'Pareto  gains'  are  achieved.  Tlhis  equity  goal  is  not related  to income  distribution in 
the usual  sense,  since  workers  in import-competing industries (such  as  autos)  may  be 
more  highly  paid  then elsewherie in the economy.  If Pareto  gains  are  specified as  a 
goal,  however,  then  these  workers  should  be  compensated  for reductions  in their 
income  due  to import  competition.  There  is considerable evidence  that  workers  forced 
to change  industries  experience  a Large  drop  in their income,  due  to the loss  of  their 
firm-specific  skills (Bale,  1976. Hamermesh,  1987).  The  question  is then  how  to best 
compensate  these  workers.  The  idea  of  "lump-sum'  transfers,  under  which  individuals 
are each  fully  compensated  for  their  losses,  is highly  impractical,  since  the 
government  would  not  know  the!  losses  faced  by  each  person.  Recently,  policies  that 
require  less  information have  been  explored  in theoretical  m0dels.2~ This  work  is 
very  recent,  however,  and  there! is no  consensus  as  to how  compensation  should  be 
achieved.  or  if is always  feasible. 
6.1  Import  Prices  versrlrs  Shares 
Thus,  the provisions of  Section 201  can  be  viewed  as one  method of  achieving 
compensation,  in a world where  the best  policy  is not  known.  This  legislation 
restricts  the use  of  tariffs or  quotas  to cases  where  import  competition is a 
"substantial  cause'  of  unemployment  or  other  injury, which is defined  as  a  'cause  that 
is important  and  not  less  than  an51  other  cause.'  In order  to implement  this rule. there must  be  some  basis  to judge  the importance of  various  causes  of  injury  within 
an  industry.  One  method  is to compare changes  in the share  of  expenditure within i3n 
industry  going  to imports,  with changes  in overall expenditure,  and  grant  protection 
only  if the  former  is greater.  For  example,  in the report  of  the U.S.  International 
Trade  Commission  (USITlC,  19(30, A-70)  to evaluate  the industry  request  for  a  tariff in 
automobiles,  it was  found  that  the import  share  rose  from  25% in Jan.-June  1979  to 
30% in July-Dec..  and  35% in Jan.-June  1980.  However,  over  the same  period U.S. 
consumption  of  autos  fell by  about  20%.  so  that  a majority of  ITC  commissioners 
determined  that  import  competition  was  not the principal cause  of  unemployment.  As 
a result,  protection  was  not  granted  under  Section  201,  but  instead,  the  VER  with 
Japan  was  negotiated. 
As  simple  as  the  above  calculation is, the use  of  import  shares  to determine the 
effects of  trade on  unemployment  extends  to many  studies, as  surveyed  in Deardorff 
and  Hakura  (1994).  For  example,  Krueger  (1980a,b)  uses  the  import  share  in a 
decomposition of  the  sources  of  unemplloyment  for  the United States,  as  do  Berman, 
Bound  and  Griliches (1994)  more  recently,  while Freeman  and  Katz  (1991) have  used 
import  volumes  as  an  explanatory  variable in regressions  explaining employment  and 
wages.  The  use  of  import  shares  has  been  criticized by  Grossman  (1  982,l986,1987). 
however,  who  argues  that  the import  share  is endogenous and  may  change  due  to marry 
underlying  causes.  Grossman's  argument  can  be  briefly  summarized  as  follows. 
Suppose  that  real expenditure  for  industry  i is denoted  by  (Ei/qi),  and  that  the 
import  share  is mi, so  that  Yi =  (1  -mi) (Ei/qi) equals  domestic  output.  If  ai workers 
are  needed  per  unit  of  output, then employment  in the  industry  is: 
According  to this expression,  changes  in employment  can  be  decomposed into change,s in 
real expenditure,  changes  in the  import:  share,  and  changes  in technology  a,.  However, 
it would  be  incorrect  to attribute any  causality  to these relations.  For  example.  if 
the import  share  rises by  10  percentage  points,  so  that  employment  falls by  lo%, it would  be  incorrect  to conclude  that  the  fall in employment  is caused  by  import 
competition.  Instead,  it might  be  that  a  fall in productivity  within the  domestic 
industry, or  a rise in wages,  h'as caused  both  the decline  in employment  and  the rise in 
imports.  The  point  to recognize  is that  the  import  share  mi, or  import  quantities. 
are  endogenous  variables,  which  should  be  taken into account  when  estimating  their 
effects on  employment  or  wages. 
To  correctly  assess  the impact  of  import  competition on  employment,  Grossman 
(1  986,  1987) recommends  that  import  prices rather  than  shares  be  used  to measure 
international competition.  He  derives  a log-linear  relation between  industry  wages  or 
employment,  and  exogenous  variables  including  the prices of  inputs,  international  price 
and  exchange  rate,  tariffs, industry  output,  and  possibly  industry  wages.  In one 
application,  Grossman  (1  986) estimates  the  impact  of  import  competition  -  measured 
by  the international  price -  on  employment  and  wages  in the U.S.  steel  industry.  It is 
found  that  job  losses  due  to import  competition depend  primarily on  the  appreciation 
of  the dollar  after  1979.  In tlhe  p~eriod  1979-83,  the  job  losses  due  to appreciation 
are  comparable  to those  due  to a secular  decline  in employment,  picked up  by  a time 
trend  in the regressi~n.~~  Over  the longer  period  1976-83, however,  the  job  losses 
due  to appreciation  are  an  order  of  magnitude  smaller  than  those  due  to the  secular 
decline.  Based  on  these results.  Grossrnan concludes  that  whether  import  competition 
is considered  the most  important  cause  of  injury  depends  on  the time period used,  and 
on  whether  exchange  rate effects  qualify  as 'injury  caused  by  imports.'29 
Grossman (1987)  applies  the  same!  methods  to a wider  group  of  U.S.  industries 
over  1969-79,  but  finds  a  significant  effect  of  import  competition on  employment  in 
only  one  of  the  nine  industries,, and  a  significant  effect of  import  competition on 
wages  in only  two.  A  greater  impact  of  import  competition on  employment  and  wages 
is obtained  by  Revenga  (1992).  Her  data  applies  to a wide sample of U.S.  industries, 
with the  advantage  that  she  has  a better  measure  of  the import  prices  than  used  by 
Grossman,  though  the disadvantage  that  she  pools  data  across  the  different  industries. 
Revenga  treats  the  import  prices  as  endogenous,  which  is to be  expected  from our discussion of  pricing under  imperfect  competition in section  3:  the import  price in 
(1  7) depends  on  domestic  prices,  and  therefore  depends  on  domestic  productivity, 
wages,  etc.  Using  industry-spjecif ik  indexes  of  exchange rates  and  foreign costs,  she 
finds  a significant  impact  of  import prices  on  both  employment  and  wages:  a 10% 
reduction  in import  prices  reduced  employment  by  3.5-3.9%,  and  reduces  wages  by 
about  1 %.  According  to these est'imates,  the reduction in import  prices  due  to dollar 
appreciation over  1980-85  redluced  employment  by  6.5-7.5%.  In addition,  Revenga 
(1  990)  re-estimates  the  relatiion between  import  volumes  and  wages  reported in 
Freeman  and  Katz  (1991). using  instrumental  variables.  She  finds  that  the revised 
estimates  reinforce the  f  indinlgs  of  Freeman  and  Katz,  that  industry  wages  respond 
significantly  to import  prices. 
From  the results  of  Gro:ssman and  Revenga,  we conclude  there is  weak  evidence 
that  import  competition lowers  wages.  Surprisingly,  however,  the converse  hypothesis 
doe  not  appear  to hold  empirically:  tariffs of  non-tariff  barriers need  not  raise 
wages.  In particular,  Gaston  and  Trefler  (1994a)  find a negative  relationship  between 
tariffs and  wages.  They  suggest  that  this may  be  due  to a willingness  of  unions  to 
accept  lower  wages  in exchange  for  employment  guarantees,  when  protection  is 
granted.  This  hypothesis  is confirmed  in later  work  (Gaston and  Trefler,  1994b), 
where  the  negative correlatior~  between  tariffs and  wages  is found  to occur  only  for-  a 
union  sample,  while non-union  wages  are  insignificantly  related to tariffs.  Gaston 
and  Trefler argue  that  this is consistent  with optimizing behavior  on  the  part  of 
unions,  if they  use  tariff protection  as  an  opportunity  to increase  employment  rather 
than  wages.  This  is demonstrated  in the  theoretical model  of  Grossman  (19841,  for 
example,  where  workers  with less  seniority  would  be  more  willing to accept  lower 
wages  in exchange  for  employment  guarantees.  The  negative correlation between wages 
and  tariffs found  by  Gaston  and  Trefler  deserves  further  empirical  study.30 
6.2  Product  Variety 
We  have  argued  above  that  the problem  with using  import  shares  to measure competition  is that  they  are endogenous:  yet,  Revenga  also  finds  that  the prices need 
to be  treated  this way.  It follows  that  either  import  shares  or  prices could  be  used 
to measure  international  competition  in a regression  framework,  provided  that 
instrumental  variables  are  used  in the  estimati~n.~'  The  question then arises as  to 
which  variable is preferred.  While  this  question  can  only  be  settled by  further 
research,  there  is one  reason  to believe  that  import  shares  will be  the preferred 
variable when  products  are  diflerentiated.  In that  case,  an  increase  in the variety  of 
imports  available  will shift demand  away  from domestic  varieties,  and  reduce  output 
and  employment.  It is doubtful,  however,  that  this impact  would be  reflected in an 
import  price index,  but  it would  be  reflected in import  shares  or  volumes,  whicb? are 
then  a better  measure  of  international  competition. 
There  is indirect  evidence  that  changes  in the range  of  product  varieties  has  had 
an  important  impact  on  trade.  This  evidence  come  from  the estimation of  import 
demand.  Since  the work  of  Houthakker  and  Magee  (1969), it has  been  known  that  the 
estimated  income  elasticity  of  demand  for U.S.  imports  exceeds  unity,  and  also 
exceeds  the  foreign  income elasticity  of  demand  for U.S.  exports.32  One  explanation 
for  the high  income  elasticity  is that  it is a  spurious result of  omitting new  product 
varieties  from  indexes  of  U.S.  implort  prices  (see Helkie  and  Hooper,  1988;  Hooper, 
1989;  and  Krugman,  1989).  According  to this  argument.  over  the past  several  decades 
the U.S.  has  experienced  an  expansion  in the range  of  new  imports  from rapidly 
growing,  developing  countries,  but  no  corresponding  decrease  in import  prices.  Then 
the rising share  of  imports is attributed to a high  income  elasticity  in the import 
demand  equations. 
To  precisely  determine  the connection between  import  prices  and  product 
variety,  suppose  that  all impo'rt varieties  within some  industry  enter  into a constant 
elasticity  of  substitution utility  or  production  function.  Let  the  elasticity  of 
substitution be  denoted  by  a, and  let TC(pt-l.pt,Ct-1.Ct)  denote  the exact  price index 
for  imports.  This  index  will decline as  new  product  varieties  become  available, 
because  the new  varieties  lower  the  cost  of  obtaining  any  level  of  utility or  output. In contrast,  a conventionally  measured  price index  -  denoted  by  P(pt-1  ,pt.Ct-l ,Ct) - 
would not  reflect  the presence of  new  product  varieties.  Let  the  set  It  denote  the 
varieties  that  are  available  in period  t, and  let  Ig(lt  n  It-1  ). I + 0, denote  any  non- 
empty  subset  of  the product  varieties  available  in both periods.  Then  Feenstra  (19'34) 
shows  that  the exact  index  is related to the conventional  index  by: 
where, 
This  result  states  that  the exact  price index  n(pt-l,pt.Ct-l  ,Ct)  equals  the 
conventional  price  index  P(pt.-1  ,pt,Ct-  1 ,Ct)  times  the additional  term  (At/At-  ) l/(cS-l) 
To  interpret  this term,  note  that  Xt  equals  the  fraction of  expenditure  in period  t  on 
the goods  ie  l relative to the entire set  ic  It.  Alternatively,  At  measures  one  minus 
the  share  of  expenditure  in period  t  on  the  new  product  varieties.  If these new 
varieties have  a  substantial  share  of  expenditure,  then  At  will be  small,  and  this  will 
tend  to make  the exact  index  n(pt-1  ,pt.Ct-l ,Ct)  significantly  lower  than  the  index 
P(pt-l,pt,Ct-i.Ct).  In other  words,  the introduction of  new  product  varieties  will 
lower the exact  price index.  The  term  At-1 equals  one  minus  the share of  expenditure 
in period  t-  1  on  the product  'varieties that  are not  available  in  t.  Thus,  if there are 
many  disappearing  varieties  between  the  two periods,  this  will tend  to make  At-1 
small, and  raise the exact  price index. 
It is clear  from  (31)  that  increases  in the  share  of  differentiated imports  from 
new  suppliers  will lower  the exact  price index,  which  will reduce employment  in the 
domestic  import-competing industry.  This  reduction  in the effective price due  to new 
product  varieties  would not  be  reflected  in a conventional  price index.  Thus,  for 
industries  where  product  differentiation is important,  it is desirable  to include 
import  shares  (either  over  alll  countries  or  just  the new  suppliers)  as  measures  of 
import  competition,  where  these  shares  must  be  treated  as  endogenous. 7.  Conclusions 
In this chapter,  we have  attempted to show  how  the evaluation of  trade  policy, 
which has  traditionally  been  based  on  models  of  competitive industries,  can  be 
extended  to incorporate  imperfect  competition.  Our  major conclusions  have  been 
summarized  in Table  1.  For  tariffs,  the key  insight  is that  imperfectly  competitive 
foreign  firms will generally  choose  to pass-through  only  a portion of  the  tariff, 
resulting  in a  terms  of  trade  gain  for  the importing country.  Most  empirical  studies 
of  incomplete pass-through  have  focused  on  exchange rates  rather  than  tariffs, though 
we  expect  that  there  is at  least  a partial symmetry  between  these effects.  These 
studies  of  exchange  rate pass-lthrough  provide  an  indication of  imperfectly  competitive 
market  conduct.  However,  because  the magnitude of  pass-through  differs substantially 
across  industries,  the possibility  of  a terms  of  trade gain cannot  be  used  as  a general 
argument  for  strategic  trade  policg. 
Indeed,  rather  than  imperfect  competition  forming  the basis  for  national  gains 
due  to trade policy,  the actual  policies  that have  been  used  have  sometimes  led  to 
losses  from enhanced collusion.  This  has  occurred  due  to the application of  anti- 
dumping  policies,  for example.  It has  also occurred  in the one  case  where  strategic 
trade  policy  in the  form of  tariffs might  have  led  to a  welfare gain:  U.S.  automobile 
imports.  The  VER  that  was  actually  used  led  to an  increase  in profits for  American 
firms, but  not  by  enough  to offset  the loss  to consumers,  so  that  the United  States 
suffered  a net  welfare loss. 
The  quality  upgrading  that  oclcurred  under  the  VER  in autos,  as  measured  by  the 
change  in product   characteristic:^,  has  also  been  observed  in a number  of  other 
industries,  where it is measured  by,  a change  in the composition of  imports.  We  have 
suggested  that  the  first measure  o~f  quality-upgrading  fits the 'ideal  variety'  approach 
to modeling  consumer  preferences  lunder  monopolistic  competition,  whereas  the  second 
measure  fits the  "love of  variety'  approach.  In either case,  an  additional  deadweight 
loss  due  to the quality change can be  estimated using  index  number  techniques.  We 
have  suggested  that  this technique  imposes  less  structure on  the data  than  the 'trade distortion index"  of  Anderson  and  Neary  (1  992,  1994a,b),  though  they  can both be  used 
to measure  the impact  of  anly  non-uniform  trade policy  over  multiple goods. 
Direct  estimates  of  the markups  charged  by  firms have  been  made  for  severa81 
developing  countries,  drawing on  methods  from  the  'new  empirical  industrial 
organization'.  It has  been  confirmed  that  trade  liberalization  tends  to reduce  the 
markups  charged  by  firms.  Again,  these empirical results lend  no  support  to a 
strategic  role for  trade  polic:y,  and  on  the contrary,  suggest  that  the application of 
tariffs may  enhance  co1,lusiort with corresponding  welfare losses.  The  one  instance  we 
have  found  where  protection may  reduce  the  distortions  caused  by  imperfect 
competition comes  from a surprising  source:  the reduction  in union  wages  under 
protection.  The  negative  correlation  between  wages  and  tariffs observed  for  the U.S. 
is consistent  with unions  accepting  employment  gains  rather  than  wage  increases  as a 
result  of  protection.  Further  work  is needed  to determine  the  generality  of  this 
result. 
We  conclude  by  rr~entioriing  a  future source  of  data  on  trade patterns  and  trade 
policy.  The  National  Science Foundation  is currently  funding  a project  to collect  large 
data  sets  on  trade -  some  of  which have  been  used  in the studies  reported in this 
chapter  -  and  make  them  widely  available on  CD-ROM.  This project  will be  completed 
by  late 1996,  and  the data  will be  described  in a working paper  of  the National  Bureau 
of  Economic  Research,  and  al:jo  will be  announced  in the Journal  of  International 
Economics.  If you  are unaware of  how  to obtain  this data  by  December  1996, please 
contact  me  by  e-mail  at  rcf~eenstraQucdavis.edu. Footnotes 
Some  of  these  studies  are  summarized  in Lindert  (1991,  Table  D.1,  p.  607). 
The  theoretical arguments  for strategic  trade policies  and  reviewed  and  the 
computable  models  are  discussed  in chapter  4 in this volume,  by  James  Brander. 
The  fact  that  social  welfare depends  on  changes  in firm-level output  to exploit 
economies  of  scale has  been  emphasized  by  Horstmann  and  Markusen  (1986).  In 
particular,  an  increase  in industry  output  by  the entry  of  firms  will not  add  to 
welfare through economies  of  scale,  but:  might  instead reflect  inefficient  entry. 
An  exception is Feens,tra (1988b),  who  estimates  the  welfare impact  of  new 
American  varieties  following  a U.S.  tariff  on  compact  trucks  from Japan.  This  tariff 
increased  the number  of  ,American models  available,  but  each  of  these  models  were 
very  similar  to existing  Japanese  models  in characteristics,  so  that  the  domestic 
models  added  very  little to consumer  welfare.  Romer  (1994)  also examines  the 
welfare cost  of  trade  restrict  ions  with changing  product  variety. 
The  early  results of  L.eamer (1974)  anticipate  some  features  of  the trade 
restrictiveness  index. 
6  More  generally,  Anderson  (1 994a)  shows  that  import  expenditures  in the  tariff- 
ridden equilibrium  are  the appropriate  weights  to use  if and  only  if the balance  of 
payments  function  has  a constant  elasticity  of  substitution  form. 
Letting  denote  the weighted mean  of  the  indtvidual tariffs, and  V  denote  the 
coefficient  of  variation (ratio of  the  weighted  stanaard  devration  to the mean),  it is 
readily  shown  that  T  = fiv2  +  1 )'I2. 
8  We  will not  make  a distinction between  actual  and  expected  exchange  rates,  though 
this can be  introduced into the model,  and  has  been  investigated  empirically  by  Froo't 
and  Klemperer  (1989) and  Feinberg  and  Kaplan  (1992). 
In general,  the function  JI*  in (1  8)  is homogeous  of  degree one  in its arguments.  It 
follows  that  one  price can  be  used  as  a  deflator  for  all other  variables  appearing  orr 
the right  and  left. lo  Harrison (1992)  finds  that  the  pass-through  behavior  of  European and  Japanese 
steel  exporters  to the U.S.  was  heavily  affected by  their  use  of  imported  intermediate 
inputs,  and  also by  changes  in U.S.  trade policy. 
l1  An  exception is automobil,es,  where  Gagnon  and  Knetter  (1992)  find that  Japanese 
producers  have  the  lowest pass-through coefficient,  followed by  German  producers  (and 
then  American.  They  suggests  that  this may  be  due  to differences  in the models 
exported by  each  country.  F~enstra.  Gagnon  and  Knetter  (1993)  relate the pass-through 
behavior  in autos  to the  share held  by  exporters  in their destination markets. 
l2  For  example,  if a market  is highly  competitive so  that  8" is close to zero.  and 
marginal  costs  are constant  or  controlled  for,  then  the pass-through  in (1  8) will be 
close  to unity.  More  generally,  we expect  that  pass-through  will depend  on  the  degree 
of  product  differentiation, as  found  by  Yang  (1  993). 
l3  Unless  the  domestic  firm obtains  an  sufficient  increase  in profits at  the expense 
of  the  foreign  firm -  a case  that  has  not  been  investigated  empirically. 
l4  One  exception  to this  is U.S.  dairy  imports, where  the quota  rents  are shared 
between U.S.  and  foreign  firms.  In addition.  Krishna  and  Tan  (1993) have  recently 
argued  that  some  sharing  of  rents  occurs  for  U.S.  imports  of  textiles  from Hong  Kong, 
and  other  countries  as  well, despite  the  fact  that  exporters  from Hong  Kong  can  sell 
their  quotas  on  an  open  market  (Hamilton,  1986). 
l5  Rodriguez  (1979) considers  the  competitive case,  while Falvey  (1979), Das  and 
Donnenfeld  (1  987,1989)  and  Krishna  (1 987)  allow  for  imperfect  competition. 
Is  The  quota  premium can  vary  across  foreign  firms, depending on  the amount  they  are 
allowed to export,  but  we  shall  not  take this into account. 
'7  A complete exposition of  exact  price indexes  is Diewert  (1976).  which is not  easy 
reading,  but  is well  worth  the effort. 
l8  Anderson  and  Neary  (1994b)  apply  the  trade restrictiveness  index  to U.S.  quotas  on 
textiles  under  the Multi-Fibre  Arrangement,  while Anderson,  Bannister  and  Neary 
(1 994)  apply  it to evaluate  Mexican  agricultural  policy. l9  In the  same  way  that  an  exact  price index  measures  the ratio of  unit-expenditure 
functions,  an  exact  quantity  index  measures  the ratio of  utility or  production 
functions  (see  Diewert,  1976),  where  we are  assuming  that  the utility  function  is 
homogenous  of  degree one. 
20  On  the other hand,  it should  be  recognized  that both  these  losses  are  substantially 
less  than  the loss  to the U.S.  due  to the  transfer  of  quota  rents  to foreign producers;, 
which  was  about  7% of  import  expenditure. 
21  In general  applications,  it would  be  important  to include  products  not  subject  to 
the  trade barriers  in the calculation,  so  that  substitution towards  them  is taken  into 
account.  Then  the  formula  in (18) would measure  both  the conventional  deadweight 
loss  triangle,  and  the extra loss  due  to upgrading. 
22  Rosen  (1974) establishes  this resu'lt  under  perfect  competition,  while Feenstra 
:I9931 discusses  the  noncompetitive  case. 
Z3  For  a later year.  1987, Feenstra  and  Levinsohn  (1  994) have  found  that  European 
~roducers  appear  to use  quantity  as  their  strategic  variable,  while American  producers 
Jse  price (and  the  strategic  va,riable of  Japanese producers  cannot  be  distinguished), 
though  a comparison  with earliler  years  11s not  made. 
z4  This  is sometimes  referred  to  as a 'rationalization'  of  the  domestic  industry. 
3rown  and  Stern  (1989)  note  that  rationalization may  fail to occur  due  to differential 
effects on  factor  prices,  and  provide  simulation results  for  U.S.-Canada  trade. 
25  A  theoretical  justification  for  this  hypothesis,  based  on  imperfect  monitoring  of 
managerial  effort, is developed  in Horn.  Lang  and  Lundgren  (1991). 
26  Note  that  this difficulty would  not  arise  when  productivity  is measured  by 
directly  estimating  the production  function (for example,  Aw  and  Hwang,  19931, 
without  relying on  real  wages  to measure  marginal  physical  products. 
2'  See  Dixit and  Norman  (1986) and  the papers  in the May  1994  Journal  of 
International  Economics.  A  particularly  dramatic  example  of  an  attempt  to achieve 
Pareto  gains  from  trade is in the union  of  East  and  West  Germany,  where  the political -- 
goal  was  that  no  citizen should  lose  from  this union;  in particular,  wages  in the  East 
and  West  should  be  equalized.  To  offset  the resulting high costs  in East  Germany, 
Akerlof  et a1  (1991) argue  that  wage  subsidies  should  be  applied  there.  There  is a 
remarkable  affinity  between  this  recommendation  and  the  theoretical policies  of  Dixit 
and  Norman  (1986).  where  factor  subsidies  (or  taxes)  play  a significant  role. 
2e  This  secular  decline  reflects technological  and  product  changes  in purchasing 
industries  (such  as  smaller  cars).  labor-saving  technological  change  in steel,  or 
growth  in other  sectors  than  \uould pull  resources  out  of  the steel  industry. 
29  Despite  this, on  June  12,  1984,  the  ITC concluded  that  import  protection was 
justified in the  steel  industry  under  Section  201. 
30  Quite different  results  for. Canada  are  reported  by  Fung  and  Huizinga  (1  991  ).  who 
find that  tariffs increase union  wages  at  the expense of  non-union  wages. 
31  In the context  of  Section 201  protection. Pindyck  and  Rotemberg  (1  987)  specify  a 
regression equation  that  explains  injury  in terms  of  variables  shifting domestic  supply 
and  demand,  along  with import  volume,  which  is treated  as  endogenous:  their  approach 
is an  alternative  to the regression  specified by  Grossman  (1986,  1987). 
32  This  result  applies  more  generally  when  comparing  the  income  elasticity of  demand 
for  imports  into  industri~al  coluntries,  with the  developed  country's  income  elasticity 
of  import  demand,  as  discussed  in the  survey  by  Goldstein  and  Khan  (1985). References 
Akerlof,  George  A.,  Andrew  K.  Rose,  Janet  L.  Yellan  and  Helga  Hessenius  (1 991)  "East 
Germany  in from  the cold:  The  economic  aftermath of  currency  union,'  Brookings 
Papers  on  Economic  Activity~.  1 :1-87. 
Anderson,  James  E.  (1991) 'The!  coefficient  of  trade utilization:  The  cheese  case,'  in 
Robert  E.  Baldwin, ed.  Empirical  studies  of  commercial  policy.  Chicago:  Univ.  of 
Chicago  Press  and  NBER,  221-244. 
Anderson.  James  E.  (1994a) 'Tariff  index  theory.'  Review  of  international  Economics. 
forthcoming. 
Anderson,  James  E.  (1994b) 'Trade  restrictiveness  benchmarks.'  Boston  College. 
mimeo. 
Anderson,  James  E..  Geoffrey  J.  Bannister  and  J.  Peter  Neary  (1 994) 'Domestic 
distortions  and  international  trade,'  lnternational  Economic  Review,  forthcoming. 
Anderson,  James  E.  and  J. Peter  Neary  ('1992) "A  new  approach  to evaluating  trade 
policy.'  Center  for Economic  Policy  Research,  discussion paper  no.  683.  London. 
Anderson,  James  E.  and  J.  Peter  Neary  (1994a) 'Measuring  the restrictiveness  of  trade 
policy.'  The  World  Bank  Review,  8:151-170. 
4nderson.  James  E.  and  J. Peter  Neary  (1994b) 'The  trade restrictiveness  of  the Multi- 
fibre arrangement,'  The  World  Bank  Review.  8:17 1 - 190. 
Aw,  Bee  Yan  (1992) 'An  empirical model  of  mark-ups  in a quality-differentiated 
export  market .'  Journal  of  International  Economics,  33:327-344. 
Aw.  Bee  Yan  (1993)  "Price discrimination and  markups  in export  markets.'  Journal  of 
Development  Economics,  42, forthcoming. 
Aw,  Bee  Yan  and  Amy  R.  Hwang  (1  993)  "Productivity  and  the export  market:  A firm- 
level  analysis.'  Penn~ylvani~a  State and  Academia  Sinica,  Taiwan,  mimeo. 
Aw, Bee  Yan  and  Mark  J.  Roberts  (1986) 'Measuring  quality  changes  in quota 
constrained import  markets:  The  case  of  U.S.  footwear,'  Journal  of  International 
Economics.  21 :45-60. Baldwin. Robert  E.  and  .Jeffrey  W.  Steagall  (1933) 'An  analysis  of  ITC  decisions  in 
antidumping,  countervailin{l duty  and  safeguard  cases,'  Univ.  of  Wisconsin,  mimeo. 
Bale,  Malcom  D.  (1976) 'Estirnates  of  trade-displacement  costs  for  U.S.  workers.' 
Journal  of  International  Economics,  6:245-250. 
Bhagwati,  Jagdish N.  (1965) 'On  the equivalence of  tariffs and  quotas,'  in Robert  E. 
Baldwin, et  al eds.  Trade,  growth  and  the balance of  payments:  Essays  in honor  of 
Gottfried Haberler.  Chicago:  Rand  McNally,  52--67. 
Berman.  Eli.  John Bound,  and  :Zvi Griliches  (1994) 'Changes  in the demand  for  skilled 
labor  within U.S.  manufacturing:  Evidence  from  the annual  survey  of 
manufacturing,'  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics.  May,  109(2):367-398. 
Berry.  Steve,  James  Levinsohn~  and  Ariel Pakes  (1994)  'Voluntary  export  restraints  on 
automobiles:  Evaluating  a  strategic  trade policy,'  Yale  University  and  University  of 
Michigan,  mimeo. 
Boorstein, Randi  and  Robert  C. Feenstra  (1991)  'Quality  upgrading  and  its welfare cost 
in U.S.  steel  import,  1969-74,"  in Elhanan  Helpman and  Assaf  Razin.  eds. 
International  trade and  tralde  policy.  Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  167-186. 
Brander,  James  A.  and  Barbara  J.  Spencer  (1984) 'Trade  warfare:  Tariffs and 
cartels,'  Journal  of  International  Economics,  16:227-242 
Bresnahan,  Timothy  F.  (1981) 'Departures  from  marginal  cost  pricing  in the  American 
automobile  industry:  Estirnates  for  1977-1  978,'  Journal  of  Econometrics,  11  :201 - 
227. 
Bresnahan,  Timothy  F.  (1989) 'Empirical  studies  of  industries  \ 
Richard  Schmalansee  and  Robert  D.  Willig, eds.  Handbook  of 
volume  [I.  Amsterdam:  hlorth-Holland,  101  1-1  057. 
Brown,  Drusilla K.  and  Robert  M.  Stern  (1989)  'U.S.-Canada  bil 
uith market  power,"  in 
industrial organization, 
ateral  tariff 
elimination:  The  role of  product  differentiation and  market  structure,'  in Robert 
C.  Feenstra,  ed.  Trade  policies  for  international  competitiveness.  Chicago: 
University  of  Chicago  and  NBER,  217-245. 
Ceglowski.  Janet  (1  991  'Dollar  import  prices  and  domestic  prices  in the  1980's:  A simultaneous  approach,'  Bryri  Mawr  College,  mimeo. 
Das,  Satya  P.  and  Shabtai  Donnenfeld  (1987)  "Trade  policy  and  its impact  on  the  quality 
of  imports:  A  welfare analysis,"  Journal  of  International Economics,  23:77-96. 
[)as,  Satya  P.  and  Shabtai  Donnenfeld  (1989) 'Oligopolistic  competition and 
international  trade:  Quantity and  quality  restrictions,'  Journal  of  International 
Economics,  27:299-318. 
Cleardorff,  Alan  V.  and  Dalia  Haltura  (1994) 'Trade  and  wages:  What  are  the 
questions?"  in Jagdish Bhagwati  and  Marvin  H.  Kosters,  eds.  Trade  and  wages. 
American  Enterprise  Institu,te,  forthcoming. 
De  Meza,  David  (1 979) 'Commercial  policy  towards  multinational monopolies  - 
Reservations  on  Katrak.'  Oxford Economic  Papers.  31 :334-337. 
Devarajan,  Shantayanan  and  Dani  Rodrik  (1991)  'Pro-competitive  effects of  trade 
reform:  Results  from  a CGE  model  of  Cameroon,'  European  Economic  Review, 
35:1 157-  1 184. 
Diewert.  W.  Erwin  (1976) 'Exact  and  superlative  index  numbers,'  Journal  of 
Econometrics.  May.  4:1 15-145. 
Dinopoulos,  Elias  and  Mordechai  Kreinin  ('1988) 'Effects  of  the U.S.-Japan  VER  on 
European prices  and  on  U.S.  welfare,'  The  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics, 
August,  484-491. 
Clixit,  Avinash  K.  and  Victor  Norman  (1986) 'Gains  from  trade  without  lump-sum 
compensation,'  Journal  of  International  Economics,  21 :1  1 1-1  22. 
Falvey.  Rodney  E.  (1  979)  'The  composition  of  trade  within import-restricted product 
categories.'  Journal  of  Political Economy,  October.  87(5):1 105-1  1 14. 
Feenstra.  Robert  C.  (1988a)  "Quality  change  under  trade restraints in U.S.  autos," 
Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics.  103(1):131-146. 
I'eenstra,  Robert  C.  (1 988b)  'Gains  from  trade  in differentiated products:  Japanese 
compact  trucks.'  in Robert  C.  Feenstra,  ed.  Empirical  methods  for  international 
trade.  Cambridge:  MIT  Press.  1 19-1  36. 
Feenstra.  Robert  C.  (1989)  'Symmetric  pass-through  of  tariffs and  exchange  rates under  imperfect  comlpetition:  An  empirical  test,'  Journal  of  International 
Economics,  27:25-45. 
Feenstra.  Robert  C.  (1992)  "How  costly  is protectionism?'  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives,  Summer,  6(:3):159-178. 
Feenstra.  Robert  C.  (1993) 'Measuring  the  we1 
and  application to Japanese  autos.'  Nat iona 
paper  no.  4401  . 
fare effect  of  quality  change:  Theory 
1  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  working 
Feenstra,  Robert  C. (1  994) 'New  product  varieties  and  the measurement  of  international 
prices.'  American  Economilc  Review,  84(1):157- 177. 
Feenstra.  Robert  C..  Knetter,  Hichael  M.  and  Joseph  E.  Gagnon  (1993) 'Market  share  and 
exchange  rate pass-through  in world  automobile  trade."  National Bureau  of  Economic 
Research.  working  paper  no.  4399. 
Feenstra,  Robert  C.  and  James  Levinsohn  (1994) 'Estimating  markups  and  market 
conduct  with multidimensional  product  attributes,'  University  of  California,  Davis, 
and  University  of  Michigan,  mimeo. 
Feinberg,  Robert  M.  (1986) 'The  interaction  of  market  power  and  exchange  rate effects 
on  German  domestic  prices;,'  Journal  of  Industrial  Economics.  September,  35:61-70. 
Feinberg,  Robert  M.  (1 989a) 'The  effects of  foreign exchange  movements  on  U.S. 
domestic  prices.'  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics,  August,  71:505-51 1. 
Feinberg.  Robert  M.  (1989b)  'Exchange  rates  and  'unfair  trade','  Review  of  Economics 
and  Statistics.  November,  71:704-707. 
Feinberg,  Robert  M.  (1  991  'The  choice  of  exchange rate index  and  domestic price 
passthrough.'  Journal  of  Industrial  Economics.  39(4):409-420. 
Feinberg,  Robert  M.  (1993)  'A  simultaneous  model  of  exchange-rate  passthrough  into 
prices  of  imperfectly  substitutable  domestic  and  import  goods.'  The  American 
University,  mimeo. 
Feinberg.  Robert  M.  and  Seth  IKaplan  (1992)  'The  response  of  domestic prices  to 
expected  exchange  rates,'  Journal  of  Business,  April,  65(2):267-280. 
Freeman.  Richard  8.  and  Lawrence  Katz  (1991)  "Industrial  wage  and  employment determination in an  open  econom~y,"  in John  M.  Abowd  and  Richard  B.  Freeman. 
Immigration,  trade,  and  the labor  market.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  and 
NBER.  235-260. 
Froot,  Kenneth  A.  and  P.  D.  Klemperer  (1989) "Exchange  rate pass-through  when  market 
share  matters,'  American  Econo~mic  Review,  September,  79:637-654. 
Fung.  K.C.  and  Harry  Huinnga (1991)  'Trade  protection and  wages  in Canada,"  University 
of  California, Santa  Cruz,  rnimeo. 
Gaston,  Noel  and  Daniel  Trefler  (1994a) 'Protection,  trade,  and  wages:  Evidence  for 
U.S.  manufacturing.'  Industrial and  Labor  Relations  Review,  forthcoming. 
Gaston,  Noel  and  Daniel  Trefler  (1994b) 'Union  wages  sensitivity  to trade  and 
protection:  Theory  and  evidence!.'  Tulane  University  and  University  of  Toronto, 
mimeo. 
Gagnon.  Joseph  and  Michael  Knetter  (1992)  "Markup  Adjustment  and  exchange  rate 
fluctuations:  Evidence  from  panel  data  on  automobile  exports.'  NBER  working  paper 
no.  4123. 
Goldberg,  Penny  Koujianou (1992)  "Product  differentiation and  oligopoly  in 
international markets:  The  case  of  the U.S.  automobile  industry,'  Princeton 
University,  mimeo. 
Goldstein,  Morris  and  Mohsin  S.  Khan  (1985)  "Income  and  price effects in foreign 
trade,'  in Ronald  W.  Jones  and  Peter  B.  Kenen,  eds.,  Handbook  of  international 
economics,  vol.  11.  Amsteridam:  North-Holland. 
Gril  iches,  Zvi  (1  97  1 )  'Hedonic  price  indexes  for  automobiles:  an  econometric  analysis 
of  quality  change.'  in Zvi  Griliches, ed.  Price indexes  and  quality  change. 
Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press. 
Gros.  Daniel  (1987)  'A  note on  the optimal  tariff, retaliation  and  the  welfare loss 
from  tariff  wars  in a  framework  with intra-industry  trade,'  Journal  of 
International  Economics,  23:35'7-367. 
Grossman.  Gene  (1982)  'Comment'  in Jagdish  N.  Bhagwati,  Import  competition and 
response.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago Press  and  NBER.  396-399. Grossman,  Gene  (1  984)  'Intern~ational  competition  and  the unionized  sector,"  Canadian 
I 
Journal  of  Economics,  17:541-556. 
Grossman,  Gene  (1986) 'Ilmports  as  a cause  of  injury:  The  case  of  the U.S.  steel 
industry.'  Journal  of  International  Economics.  20:201-223. 
Grossman,  Gene  (1987) 'The  employment  and  wage  effects of  import  competition," 
Journal  of  lnternational  Economic  Integration,  2:l-23. 
Hall,  Robert  (1988) 'The  relation between  price and  marginal  cost  in U.S.  industry,' 
Journal  of  Political Economy.  96:921-947. 
Hamilton.  Carl  (1986) 'An  assessment  of  voluntary  restraints on  Hong  Kong  exports  to 
Europe  and  the U.S..'  Economica.  August.  53(21 1):339-350. 
Hamermesh  (1987) 'The  costs  of  worker  displacement,'  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  February,  102(1):51-75. 
Hansen.  Wendy  L.  and  Thomas  ,I.  Prusa  (1993) 'The  road  most  traveled:  The  rise of 
Title VII protection,'  State Univ.  of  New  York  at  Stony  Brook,  mimeo. 
Harrigan.  James  (1991) 'Openess  to trade  in manufactures  in the  OECD.'  University  of 
Pittsburgh,  Department  of  E:conomics.  working  paper  no  272. 
Harris,  Richard  G.  (1985)  'Why  voluntary  export  restraints  are  'voluntary',"  Canadian 
Journal  of  Economics,  November,  18(4):799-809. 
Harrison.  Ann  (1  991)  'The  new  trade protection:  Price effects of  antidumping  and 
countervailing measures  in the United  States.'  The  World  Bank,  Trade  Policy 
Division,  working  paper  no.  808. 
Harrison,  Ann  (1992) 'Imperfect  explanations  for  imperfect  pass-through:  Market 
power  and  exchange  rates  in the U.S.  steel  industry,'  July,  The  World  Bank,  mimeo. 
Harrison,  Ann  (1994a)  'Productivity,  imperfect  competition  and  trade  reform,'  Journal 
of  International  Economics,  forthcoming. 
Harrison,  Ann  (1994b) 'An  empirical  test  of  the  infant  industry  argument:  Comment," 
American  Economic  Review,  forthcoming. 
Helkie. William H.  and  Peter  Iiooper  (1988) 'The  U.S.  external  deficit  in the  1980s: 
An  empirical  analysis.'  in R.C.  Bryant,  G.  Holtham  and  P.  Hooper,  eds.,  External deficits and  the  dollar:.  The  pit  and  the pendulum.  Washington,  D.C.:  The  Brookings 
Institution. 
Hlelpman,  Elhanan  and  Paul  Krugrnan  (1985) Market  structure and  foreign  trade. 
Cambridge:  MIT  Press. 
Hooper,  Peter  (1989)  "Exchange  rates  and  U.S.  external  adjustment  in the  short  run and 
the  long  Run,'  Board  of  Governors,  lnternational  Finance  Disc.  Paper  no.  346.  March. 
Horn,  Henrik,  Harald  Lang  and  Stefan Lundgren  (1991) 'Managerial  effort incentives.  X- 
inefficiency, and  international  trade,'  lnstitute  for  lnternational  Economic  Studies. 
Stockholm  University.  December,  mimeo. 
Horstmann,  lgnatius  J.  and  James  R.  Markusen (1 986) 'Up  the average  cost  curve: 
Inefficient  entry  and  the  new  protectionism,'  Journal  of  lnternational Economics, 
20:225-247. 
Houthakker,  Henrik  S.  and  Stephen P. Magee  (1969) "Income  and  price elasticities  in 
world  trade.'  The  Review  of  Economics  and  Statistics. May.  51 (2):l  1 1-1  25. 
Hufbauer.  Gary  Clyde  and  Kimberly  Ann  Elliott (1994)  Measuring  the costs of 
protection  in the United  States.  Washington.  D.C.:  lnstitute  for  lnternational 
Economics. 
Johnson,  Harry  G.  (1960)  "The  cost  of  protection and  the  scientific tariff,'  Journal  of 
Political  Economy,  68(4):327-345,  August. 
Katrak,  Homi  (1977)  'Multi-national  monopolies  and  commercial  policy,'  Oxford 
Economic  Papers,  29,  283-291. 
Katz.  Lawrence F.  and  Lawrence  H.  'Summers (1  gaga)  'Can  interindustry  wage 
differentials  justify  strategic  trade  policy?'  in Robert  C.  Feenstra,  ed..  Trade 
policies  for  international competitiveness.  Chicago:  Univ.  of  Chicago  and  NBER, 
85-1 16. 
Katz,  Lawrence  F.  and  Lawrence  H.  'Summers  (1989b) 'Industry  rents:  Evidence  and 
implications.'  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity: Microeconomics,  209-290. 
Knetter.  Michael  M.  (1989) 'Price  discrimination  by  U.S.  and  German  exporters,' 
American  Economic  Review.  79(1l):198-210.  March. Knetter.  Michael  M.  (1993)  'International  comparisons  of  pric 
American  Economic  Review,  83(  3):473-486,  June. 
Knetter,  Michael  M.  and  Joseph  E.  Gagnon  (1992) 'Markup  adjus 
ing-to-market  behavior.' 
tment  and  exchange  rate 
fluctuations:  Evidence  from panel  data  on  automobile  exports,'  National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research,  working paper  no.  41 23. 
Krishna,  Kala  (1987) 'Tariffs  versus  quotas  with endogenous  quality.'  Journal  of 
International  Economics.  2!;:97-  1 1 7. 
ishna,  Kala  (1989) 'Trade  restrictions  as  facilitating practices,'  Journal  of 
International  Economics,  Ma~y. 26(3/4):251-270. 
ishna.  Kala  and  Ling Hui  Tan  (1993) 'On  the importance  and  extent  of  rent  sharing  in 
the Multi-fibre arrangement:  Evidence  from  U.S.-Hong  Kong  trade  in appare1,'mimeo. 
Krueger,  Anne  0. (1  980a)  'Protectionist  pressures,  imports  and  employment  in the 
United  States,'  Scandinaviar~  Journal of  Economics,  82(2), 133-1  46. 
Krueger,  Anne  0. (1 98Ob)  'Restructuring  for  import  competition  from  developing 
countries. I:  Labor  displacement  and  economic  redeployment  in the United  States,' 
Journal  of  Policy  Modeling.  2(2),  1 65-  1 84. 
Krueger,  Anne  0. and  Buran  Turrcer  (1982) 'An  empirical  test  of  the infant  industry 
argument ,'  American  Economic  Review,  December,  72:  1 142-  1 1 52. 
Krugman,  Paul  R.  (1987)  "Pricing  to market  when  the exchange rate changes,'  in Sven 
W.  Arndt  and  J. David  Richardson,  eds.  Real-financial  linkages  among  open 
economies.  Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  49-70. 
Krugman,  Paul  (1989)  'Differences  in income  elasticities  and  trends  in real exchange 
rates,'  European  Economic  Rleview,  33:1031- 1054. 
Lawrence  (1987)  'Imports  in Japan:  Closed  markets  or minds?'  Brookings Papers  on 
Economics  Activity.  51 7-55'4. 
Leamer.  Edward  E.  (1974)  'Nominal  tariff  averages  with estimated  weights,'  Southern 
Economic  Journal.  41  (1  ):34--46. July. 
Leamer,  Edward  E.  (1988a)  'Cr80ss-section estimation of  the effects of  trade 
barriers,"  in Robert  C.  Feenstra,  ed.  Empirical  methods  for  international  trade. Cambridge.  MA:  MIT  Press.  52-82. 
I-earner, Edward E.  (1988b)  "Measures  of  openness.'  in Robert  E.  Baldwin, ed.  Trade 
policy  issues  and  empirical  analysis.  Chicago: Univ.  of  Chicago  Press  and  NBER. 
I-eamer.  Edward  E.  (1990) 'The  structure and  effects of  barriers in 1983,'  in Ronald 
W.  Jones  and  Anne  0. Krueger,  eds.  'The  political economy  of  international  trade. 
Oxford:  Basil  Blackwelll.  224-260. 
Levinsohn.  James  (1993)  'Testing  the  imports-as-market-discipline  hypothesis,' 
Journal  of  lnternational  Economics,  35(1/2):1-22. 
Lindert. Peter  H.  (1 991  )  International  economics.  Boston:  Irwin,  9th edition. 
Ilann,  Catherine  L.  (1  986)  'Prices,  prof it margins,  and  exchange  rates,'  Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin,  June.  366-379. 
Pindyck.  Robert  S.  and  Ju'lio J.  Rotemberg  (1987) 'Are  imports  to blame?  Attribution 
of  injury  under  the  19'74  Trade  Act.'  Journal  of  Law  and  Economics,  April.  30:lOl-. 
122. 
Prusa.  Thomas  (1  992) 'Why  are  so  many  antidumping  petitions  withdrawn?'  Journal  of 
International economics.  August.  1-20. 
Revenga,  Ana  L.  (1  990) 'Wage  deterrnination in an  open  economy:  International  trade 
and  U.S.  manufacturing  wages,'  tiarvard University,  mimeo. 
Revenga.  Ana  L.  (1992) 'Exporting  jobs?  The  impact  of  import  competition on 
employment  and  wages  in U.!;.  manufacturing.'  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 
February,  255-284. 
Rodriguez.  Carlos  Alfredo (1979)  'The  quality  of  imports  and  the  differential  Welfare 
effects of  tariffs, quotas  and  quality  controls  as  protective  devices,'  Canadian 
Journal  of  Economics.  12:43!3-449. 
Rodrik.  Dani  (1988) 'Imperfect  competition,  scale  economics,  and  trade  policy  in 
developing  countries,"  in Roblert  E.  Baldwin, ed.  Trade  policy  issues  and  empirical 
analysis.  Chicago:  Universit!l  of  Chicago  and  NBER.  109-1 37. 
Romer.  Paul  (1  994) 'New  goods,  old  theory,  and  the  welfare costs  of  trade 
restrictions,"  Journal  of  Development  Economics,  43:s-38. Rosen.  Sherwin  (1  974)  'Hedonic  prices  and  implicit  markets:  Product  differentiation  ' 
in pure  competition,'  Journal  of  Pol1,tical Economy,  82:34-55. 
Saxonhouse,  Gary  R.  (1989) 'Differentiated  products,  economies  of  scale,  and  access  to 
the Japanese  market,'  in Robert  C.  Feenstra,  ed.  Trade  policies  for  international 
competitiveness.  Chicago:  IJniversity  of  Chicago  and  NBER,  145-1  74. 
Schembri,  Lawrence  (1989) 'Export  prices  and  exchange rates:  An  industry  approach.' 
in Robert  C.  Feenstra,  ed.  Trade  policies  for  international  competitiveness. 
Chicago:  Univ.  of  Chicago  a~nd  NBER,  185-206. 
Staiger,  Robert  and  Frank  Wolak  (I  994)  'Measuring  industry  specific protection: 
Antidumping  in the United  States,'  National  Bureau of  Economic  Research.  working 
paper  no.  4696. 
Svedberg,  Peter  (1979)  'Optimal  tariff  policy  on  imports  from  multinationals,'  The 
Economic  Record.  March,  64-67. 
Trefler.  Daniel  (1993)  'Trade  liberalization and  the  theory  of  endogenous  protection: 
An  econometric  study  of  U.S.  import  policy,'  Journal  of  Political Economy, 
101:138-160. 
Tybout.  James  R.  (1993) 'Increasing  returns  as a source of  comparative advantage:  The 
evidence.'  Georgetown  University.  working  paper  no.  93-0 1. 
U.S.  International  Trade  Commission  (1980)  'Certain  motor  vehicles  and  certain 
chassis  and  bodies  therefor,'  USITC  Publication  11  10,  Washington,  D.C. 
Yang,  Jiawen  (1993) 'Exchange  rate pass-through  in U.S.  manufacturing  industries," 
Vanderbilt  University,  mimeo. Table 1  : Trade Policv Issues and Estimation Methods 
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Results 
Index number method imposes 
less structure on the data, but there 
is little experience with its use. 
Strong evidence that pass-through 
is less than unity, though its size 
differs substantiallv across industries. 
Strong evidence that the dumping 
actions reduce imports, even when 
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Invalid to correlate tanffs with TFP  to 
assess "infant industry" protection. 
Simultaneity of  import prices or share: 
must be taken into account.  Weak 
evidence that import competitiori 
lowers employment and wages, but 
tariffs do not raise union wages. Price 
Imports 
Fiqure 1 Price 
Imports Variety  2 
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